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ABSTRACT 
As a study in the Bush Doctrine of preventive warfare, the conflict in Iraq has 
been of great interest. However, the unintended consequences and the impact on regional 
instability also demand attention. There is a balance of power struggle taking place 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia which, because of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, has drawn the 
attention of the international community and the ire of the United States. As a result, 
policy makers in Washington are compelled to determine a course of action that would, at 
best, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or, at worst, return the region to a 
modicum of calm. Indeed, the issue has become the most divisive matter between 
presumptive presidential nominees Barack Obama and John McCain. 
It is necessary then, to examine the behavior of Iran and Saudi Arabia against the 
tenets of realism and state behavior through the lens of political scientists John 
Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt. By reviewing offensive, defensive, and 
balancing behavior within the Middle East system, the predictive analysis should enable 
policy makers to determine the appropriate measure of sticks and carrots that would 
achieve U.S. national interests in the region.  
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This thesis will examine the far-reaching consequences of the Iraq War on the 
balance of power in the Middle East. Various scholars assert that the United States has 
lost influence in the region as a result of the war and is less able to serve as the guarantor 
of regional security and stability. One of the results of the invasion is that Iran and Saudi 
Arabia have emerged as regional rivals, with both states now at the head of an alliance of 
regional states and (in Iran’s case) non-state actors.  It could be argued that the posturing 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia reflects classic balance of power theory and has resulted 
in a new arms race that, considering Iran’s nuclear ambitions, has dangerous 
implications. The objective then, is to determine to what extent regional actors are acting 
in ways that are consistent with realist balance of power theory and the implications for 
U.S. foreign policymakers in this historically unstable but strategically vital region.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
 Since the discovery of oil in the Middle East, the United States has pursued 
regional stability through a variety of instruments to protect its national interests in the 
region.  Much of this has to do with the U.S. role as the world’s wealthiest economy as 
well as the largest consumer of energy. The U.S., as guarantor of security, has helped 
create an environment in which the oil rich states have brought their product to market.  
One of the regrettable regional developments created by the flood of cash into these 
societies is that the funding has been used to support militias, corrupt politicians, and 
spread radical ideologies. The result has been a tenuous stability that has maintained the 
flow of oil but kept the region from achieving a lasting peace. While the Middle East has 
been wrought with religious conflict and political turmoil over the past sixty years, U.S. 
power and influence has helped maintain the predictable flow of oil to world markets.   
Instigated by the U.S. under the Bush Administration’s doctrine of preventive 
war, the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation have disturbed the regional balance and 
 2
created an imbroglio with far-reaching consequences.1 Iraq, which once served as a 
buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, is now regarded by some as a “failing state” and is 
the object of competition between Sunni and Shi’a Arab groups competing for control 
over Iraq’s political institutions and, by extension, its oil resources.  
Iran and Saudi Arabia are now engaged in activity that appears consistent with the 
realist international relations theory, with its emphasis on states seeking to create 
favorable balances of power.2 Whether this will create a more stable Middle East remains 
unclear. The implications of the theory, however, is that each state will continue to 
pursue what it perceives as a stable balance of power that may result in the proliferation 
of nuclear arms in the hands of ideologically-minded regimes. In addition to seeking a 
nuclear program, Iran has been supporting proxy conflicts in Iraq and throughout the 
region in a show of support for its Shi’a brand of Islam.  In response, Sunni-led Saudi 
Arabia has secured a multi-billion arms deal from the U.S. and has spent a lot of 
diplomatic energy reinforcing relationships with its allies in the Gulf.   
In order to prevent a regional arms race in the Middle East, the overall question 
this thesis seeks to answer is: What are the implications for U.S. foreign policy of the 
changed regional balance of power in the Middle East?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the study of international relations, realist balance of power refers to the 
tendency of competing states to alter their perceived power posture in order to ensure the 
survival of the state and to promote the power of the state relative to rivals that pose a 
threat to national survival. Where equilibrium is not achieved, war is the likely result 
because one side may feel threatened by the perceived lack of relative power.  While 
there are numerous theorists that seek to explain this paradigm, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen 
                                                 
1 For more on preventive war, see James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive 
War and Preemption,” The Nonproliferation Review 10, Issue 1 Spring 2003, 113-123. 
<http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/10736700308436920> (June 3, 2008). 
2 For more on realism, see Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939; an Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1940); Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace, 1st ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948); and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979). 
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Walt, and John Mearsheimer are widely accepted as the preeminent political scientists 
regarding balance of power theory and its relevance to neo-realism.3 
1. Realism – Balance of Power Theory 
As neo-realists, these political scientists accept certain assumptions regarding 
their analysis of states’ behavior in the international system. The assumptions are as 
follows:  
• States are principal actors in the international system;  
• The international system is characterized by anarchy;  
• The accepted behavior of states in an anarchic system is “self-help” in which 
states “must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they 
can make for themselves;”4  
• Behavior of states in the international system is influenced mainly by external 
factors;  
• States are rational actors;  
• The international system “comprises independent political units (states) that 
have no central authority above them.”5   
Beyond these common assumptions, the theorists present decidedly opposing 
views on competing states’ behavior in a realist system. Mearsheimer presents a theory of 
offensive realism as an alternative to Waltz’ defensive realism, while Walt’s primary 
focus remains on states’ tendency to engage in balancing behavior.6  
                                                 
3 Whereas realism is the belief that states are motivated primarily by the quest for economic or 
military power, neo-realism or structural realism is the belief that the international system is a constraint 
on state behavior and thus the amount of power a state can project is restrictive and will certainly generate a 
response from a competitor. Neo-realism is further broken down into offensive and defensive realism.   
Kenneth Waltz has written several tomes on the subject of neo-realism, most prominent among them is 
Theory of International Politics. Mearsheimer’s contribution is The Tragedy of Great Power Politics in 
which he introduces offensive realism. Stephen Walt is credited with expanding the discussion of balance 
of power theory in his book The Origins of Alliances. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987).  
4 Waltz, 111.  
5 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 
19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 10.  
6 For an examination of the differences between offensive and defensive realism, see Robert Jervis, 
Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.” International Security, Vol. 24, no. 
1 (Summer 1999): 47-50. 
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a. John Mearsheimer – Offensive Realism 
 In the realm of international politics, John Mearsheimer is most concerned 
with the behavior of the “great power” states and their tendency to seek power at each 
other’s expense in what he calls offensive realism.7 The foundation for offensive realism 
is that in an anarchic system the best guarantor of security is the maximization of power. 
Mearsheimer argues that the great powers are continually “searching for opportunities to 
gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.”8 As such, it is absolute 
power that great powers seek to achieve and not power relative to competing states.9 
Mearsheimer’s contention that states seek absolute power with the 
ultimate purpose of becoming a hegemon in which they are the dominant power in the 
system assumes a large power gap between the hegemon and the second most powerful 
state in the system. However, this does not necessarily mean that the hegemon lacks an 
external threat. Hegemons do not want peers and seek to prevent other states from 
achieving hegemony. Hence, the hegemon will continue to seek advances in power to 
prevent other potential hegemons from achieving that status. Because states that conform 
to the paradigm of offensive realism are constantly seeking power, Mearsheimer argues 
that the multi-polar system – that with multiple great powers struggling to achieve 
hegemony—is more war-prone than bi-polar systems.10 
 
                                                 
7 Mearsheimer does not discount the smaller states but claims the great power states “have the largest 
impact on what happens in the international system.” Additionally, Mearsheimer identifies ‘great powers’ 
as those states with significant military capabilities that could “put up a serious fight in an all-out 
conventional war against the most powerful states in the world.” For more, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics, 5. 
8 Ibid., 29. 
9 States concerned with the former are only concerned with the continued achievement of additional 
power while states that desire the latter believe in achieving a balance of power seen in defensive realism. 
10 Ibid., 338. Mearsheimer uses the example of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to demonstrate how the 
bi-polar system created the longest period of stability in modern history. His contention is that the multi-
polar system is far more dangerous than a bi-polar system for three reasons: First, there are more 
opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multi-polar system. Second, 
imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multi-polar world, and thus great powers are more likely 
to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the 
potential for miscalculations is greater in multi-polarity: states might think they have the capability to 
coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not. 
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Mearsheimer believes that, as power maximizers, states are not satisfied 
with a balance of power and that the best deterrent for war is a balanced bi-polar system 
in which the two hegemons exert their influence over lesser states in order to prevent the  
likelihood of war. Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that if deterrence fails, buck-
passing, rather than balancing, is the preferred choice of states that do not wish to fight an 
aggressor.11 
b. Kenneth Waltz – Defensive Realism 
In contrast to Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, in his seminal work, Theory 
of International Politics, argues that states are defensive in nature and rather than power, 
they first seek security. The anarchic system, he argues, is prone to war and international 
politics are far too dangerous for states to maximize power as John Mearsheimer 
purports. Waltz believes that those states that make power their primary goal open 
themselves up for aggression by other, lesser states. This is why Waltz has supported the 
slow spread of nuclear weapons as a deterrent for war.12  
Waltz argues that in a conventional war, “states going to war can at once 
believe that they may win and that, should they lose, the price of defeat will be 
bearable.”13 However, nuclear warfare would render defeat not simply unbearable but 
catastrophic. Nuclear weapons give countries a feeling of security and dissuade states 
from going to war not for fear of what a state will do but rather what they can do. The 
international system, however, refuses to recognize that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons will increase stability, mainly out of concern for irrational, non-state actors that 
could obtain the technology. Therefore, in order to achieve security, Waltz argues that the 
                                                 
11 Mearsheimer spends a significant amount of time on balancing and buck-passing in The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, ibid, 267-333. 
12 Indeed, Waltz has written several articles and books which provide amplifying support of his 
theory. He posits that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent to aggression and states that seek them are 
more inclined to be subject to international rules due to the high cost of entry into the nuclear community. 
See,  Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi papers, (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). 
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 
The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 6th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), 116. 
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international system induces states to engage in balancing behavior.14 His claim is that a 
state’s first concern is “not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the 
system.”15 As such, balance is achieved when it is relative to the actor being balanced 
against within the same anarchic system. Therefore, when a state gains power through 
new technology or advanced weaponry, according to Waltz, it is not being offensive but 
rather balancing against the threat posed by the increase in power of competing states.  
c. Steven Walt – Balancing 
 Steven Walt has perhaps contributed more to the discussion of balancing 
than any other political scientist. He is credited with restating “balance of power” as 
“balance of threat” which, scholars argue, more accurately depicts the paradigm and its 
influence on the international system. While it may appear to be an argument of 
semantics, Walt argues that states form alliances not to balance a perceived increase in 
power but as a response to the threat that that power increase implies.16  
In opposition to Mearsheimer, Walt argues that balancing is more 
common than bandwagoning because states prefer to “join alliances in order to avoid 
domination by stronger powers.”17 Walt also claims that states prefer balancing because 
states place their survival at risk “if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it 
becomes too strong” and because “joining the more vulnerable side increases the new 
member’s influence [within an alliance] because the weaker side has greater need for 
assistance.”18 
Walt’s theory on balancing supports that those states that seek security 
over power will engage in balancing. These states, according to Walt, “avoid appearing 
                                                 
14 In contrast to balancing, bandwagoning occurs when weaker states seek to maximize power by 
aligning with stronger states. Waltz and Mearsheimer address the differences in Theory of International 
Politics, 126 and The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 267-333, respectively.  
15 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126 
16 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, 263. 
17  Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985), 5. 
18  Ibid., 6. 
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aggressive” and enact policies that “demonstrate restraint and benevolence.”19 He argues 
a system in which bandwagoning is the norm is much more competitive since states in 
this system are power maximizers and are inclined to be aggressive if there is a perceived 
loss of power.  
d. Summary 
 Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Walt provide compelling arguments on the 
behavior of states in the international system using a realist context. While Mearsheimer 
supports an offensive realist viewpoint in which states are power maximizers and prefer 
to engage in bandwagoning, Waltz’ contention is that states seek security rather than 
power and would rather balance against those states that seek power. Lastly, Walt 
explains balancing and bandwagoning as used by offensive and defensive realists. By 
using the paradigms provided by Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Walt, this thesis will 
determine the predictive value of neo-realism in an examination of the Middle East as it 
pertains to Iran and Saudi Arabia. In doing so, I intend to determine policy implications 
for the U.S. and recommend courses of action. 
2. In the Wake of Iraq: Balance of Power in the Middle East  
As a matter of international relations and the realization of preemption as U.S. 
policy, the execution of the Iraq War has been of global interest.20 Although the 
intentions of the U.S. appeared to be sound at the time, the multiple failures–the absence 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the rampant looting and inability to maintain 
security immediately following the fall of Baghdad characterized by an insurgency and 
sectarian violence, “de-Ba’athification,” and lack of a functioning government—suggest 
that the mission in Iraq has been an abysmal failure. Furthermore, in addition to the 
significant loss of life, by the end of fiscal year 2007, the Iraq War will have cost 
                                                 
19  Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985)., 14. 
20 In a 2003 article for Foreign Policy, Mearsheimer and Walt argued that the war was unnecessary 
because relative the U.S., Iraq was simply too weak to pose a real threat and Saddam’s past behavior 
demonstrated that a policy of “deterrence and containment would work.” See Mearsheimer, John J., and 
Stephen M. Walt. “An Unnecessary War.” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (February 2003): 50-59.  
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taxpayers over $450 billion and, at current troop levels, could exceed $1 trillion by 
2009.21 Despite the seemingly endless number of reasons to withdrawal from Iraq and 
lacking popular support from the Democrat-led Congress, In early 2007, President Bush 
committed an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq in an attempt to provide the security 
necessary for the Iraqi people to focus on strengthening the government. Whatever the 
outcome, Iraq’s neighbors will have played significant roles and, therefore, any 
discussion regarding the withdrawal from Iraq should also address foreign policy vis-à-
vis Iran and Saudi Arabia after Iraq. Because Saudi Arabia and Iran have long been 
considered the two regional powers in the Middle East, it is appropriate to measure 
recommended courses of action against balance of power theory in order to determine the 
likely results of U.S. action. 
a. Status Quo 
 Despite the Saudi royal family’s poor record with regards to political 
rights and civil liberties, the U.S. has recognized the need to maintain its relationship 
with the Saudis. In the mutually beneficial relationship, Saudi Arabia has used its 
influence among the oil producing countries to maintain the flow of oil at reasonable 
prices while the U.S. has guaranteed the security of Saudi oil exports across the globe.22  
However, the argument to maintain the status quo is not based exclusively on oil. The 
U.S.-Saudi alliance has been a shared commitment to defeat a common enemy.23  
During the Cold War, the U.S. used its alliance with Saudi Arabia to 
prevent Soviet influence in the Middle East and the potential disruption of the flow of 
                                                 
21  See Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
since 9/11, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 16, 2007) and Peter Orszag, Estimated 
Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other Activities Related to the War on Terrorism 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, October 24, 2007). 
22 This dynamic has changed considerably since 2001 as reflected by the sky-rocketing price of oil 
from less than $30 per barrel in 2001 to over $120 in May 2008. Among the factors credited with the rapid 
escalation in price are regional instability as well as the growing global demand due to the burgeoning 
middle class populations in China and India. Since January 2008, President Bush has twice met with the 
Saudi king to ask for an increase in oil production. The slight increase in oil production has done little to 
curb the rising price as oil neared $130 in June.  
23 Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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resources. Middle East scholar Maurice Lavian, a regular contributor to Scholars for 
Peace in the Middle East suggests that “The U.S./Saudi relationship has always been 
based on shared strategic interests rather than a mutual ‘friendship’” but the recent 
events, particularly in Iran, have strengthened the relationship.24 Rachel Bronson, a 
senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations 
recognized that the two countries were once allied in the fight against communism just as 
they are now allied against Iran.25 Headlines suggest the accuracy and relevancy of this 
commitment as the U.S. recently announced a plan to provide a multi-billion dollar arms 
package to the kingdom in an apparent attempt to demonstrate a united front against 
Iran.26 As the militarily weaker power, and despite resistance from its populace, Saudi 
Arabia has allied itself with the United States’ in order to balance the threat of Iran. 
Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is consistent with defensive realism and 
balancing. As long as the U.S. continues its support for Saudi Arabia, Iran will feel 
threatened and will seek security to balance against the perceived threat of the U.S.-Saudi 
Alliance. U.S. relations with Iran have been strained since the 1979 revolution and the 
crisis in which Iranian students overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two 
Americans hostage for over four hundred days. As a result of the crisis, the U.S. broke 
diplomatic relations and in 2002, on the heels of the 9/11 attacks, in his “Axis of Evil” 
speech President Bush identified Iran as a government which sponsored terrorism and 
sought weapons of mass destruction.27 Reports also indicate that Iran has been supplying 
arms and funding Shi’a insurgents in Iraq which certainly gives credence to maintenance 
of the status quo vis-a-vis Iran.28 In a speech before the House International Relations 
Committee, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns stated that “no option is off the 
                                                 
24  Maurice Lavian, "How Iran has Strengthened the U.S./Saudi Alliance," The Middle East Now, 
http://www.themiddleeastnow.com/ussaudialliance.html (August 6, 2007). 
25  Bronson, 353. 
26  Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, "Rice Outlines Saudi Arms Package," New York Times, sec. 
Europe, July 30, 2007, < http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/europe/30cnd-
weapons.html?ex=1186632000&en=72c03807fc0a7b94&ei=5070> (August 6, 2007). 
27  George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (August 7, 2007). 
28 Wright, Robin. “Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say.” The Washington Post, June 3, 
2007. 
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table” and suggested that if multilateral talks fail to achieve the stipulated goals, the U.S. 
would have no choice but to consider targeted sanctions.29 In a show of strength and 
determination toward Iran, the U.S. conducted naval exercises in the Persian Gulf 
beginning in October 2006 and maintained two carrier battle groups near Iranian territory 
until August 2007.  
The cited examples and current events demonstrate that it is the policy of 
the United States to maintain the status quo, thereby continuing its military support of 
Saudi Arabia while refusing diplomatic relations with Iran. Unfortunately, as long as the 
U.S. continues its support for Saudi Arabia, Iran will feel threatened and, according to 
defensive realism and Walt’s theory of balancing, will seek security and attempt to 
balance against the perceived threat of the U.S.-Saudi Alliance. Thus, the status quo has 
not resulted in regional stability and Iran continues its apparent march toward nuclear 
power in true balancing fashion. The counter argument suggests that it is time to reverse 
course in U.S. foreign relations with both states. 
b. A New Course 
 The overwhelming concern in the opposition camp is that by providing 
arms to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. appears to be solely supportive of Sunni Muslims. Shi’a-
led Iran then, must improve its own security posture in order to balance the threat of its 
neighbor. Additionally, there is a concern that Saudi Arabian policies have fostered the 
Islamic fundamentalist characteristics evident in those Muslims who are committing 
terrorist acts and suicide bombings. There are a number of reports, including the Iraqi 
Study Group report, that show that not only are Saudis funding the insurgency in Iraq, but 
the majority of suicide bombers in Iraq are often Saudi citizens or practitioners of Saudi 
Sunni Islam.30 As such, many scholars and journalists in Middle East studies have 
recommended an alternative to U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. In a 2004 
                                                 
29  R. Nicholas Burns, "United States Policy Toward Iran: Opening Statement before the House 
International Relations Committee," U.S. State Department, 
<http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/62779.htm> (August 7, 2007). 
30  For more information, see James A. Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report, 1st 
authorized. (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), p 142. Susan B. Glasser, "‘Martyrs’ in Iraq mostly Saudis," 
Washington Post, May 15, 2005, sec. 15. 
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article in The National Interest, Michael Sieff suggests that the U.S. put real pressure on 
the Saudis to reign in Wahhabi extremists but stops short of recommending that the U.S. 
ask for a “shopping list” of reforms such as free elections, freedom of the press and other 
political goods.31 Sieff believes that the U.S. should use its influence to shape Saudi 
policies, but he recognizes that it still serves U.S. interests not to perpetrate anything that 
could result in a toppling of the al-Saud family. Rachel Bronson agrees the U.S. should 
exercise its influence but takes it a step further. She recommends that the U.S. “should 
develop comprehensive social, economic, and political reform strategy that supports local 
efforts,” because the “politicization of religion” has contributed to the creation of those 
that would commit terrorist acts.32 In its “Policy Recommendations for the 108th 
Congress, the Cato Institute provided a litany of policy changes in order to pressure Saudi 
Arabia into political and civil reformation. The document states that the U.S. 
commitment to the al-Saud family is “a moral blemish and a practical danger.”33 
According to Rachel Stohl of the Center for Defense Information, the arms sale to Saudi 
Arabia “may provoke Iran into accelerating its own arms purchases,” and suggests that 
Russia and China may fill the gap left by the U.S. thus creating a regional arms race.34  
As stated above, although the two states are engaged in proxy wars in 
Lebanon, Israel, Gaza, and now Iraq, the U.S. has maintained diplomatic distance from 
Iran. Many argue that by continuing to isolate Iran, Washington is pushing Tehran to 
react in a manner that is contrary to U.S. national interests and will only endeavor Iran to 
escalate the tensions. At face value, it appears that U.S. military posturing and refusal to 
hold talks has committed Iran firmly to its nuclear goals. That is why Ted Carpenter, of 
the Cato Institute, compares the Iran situation to that of the U.S. relationship with North 
Korea. In that case Washington made little progress until it finally agreed to multilateral 
                                                 
31  Martin Sieff, "Sand in our Eyes: U.S.-Saudi Relations After Iraq," The National Interest (2004), 
93-94. 
32  Rachel Bronson, "Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship," The 
Washington Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2005), 129. 
33  Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Alliance with Saudi Arabia," Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy 
Recommendations for the 108th Congress, (Washington D.C.: The CATO Institute, 2007). 
34  Rachel Stohl, "The Saudi Arms Deal: Congressional Opposition Grows," Center for Defense 
Information, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4057&from_page=../index.cfm 
(August 11, 2007). 
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negotiations, at which point a “crucial” breakthrough took place.35 In March 2004 after 
conservatives won many of the seats in the Iranian parliament, David Phillips from the 
Council of Foreign Relations suggested that it was time for “pragmatism” in U.S.-Iran 
relations. He asserted that after the “Axis of Evil” speech, Iranians were worried that they 
were next. However, Iranians were relieved when Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage indicated that the U.S. would not seek regime change as policy. Phillips 
recommends that while the International Atomic Energy Agency should be working with 
Iran, “direct contact between the U.S. and Iranian officials is needed when it comes to 
Iraq.”36 In April of 2006, when asked why we do not have negotiations with Iran, Joseph 
Cirincione, from the Council on Foreign Relations offered a more visceral response. "The 
United States is not even talking to Iran yet. Why not? Why aren't we negotiating with 
Iran? We negotiated with Libya. We're negotiating with North Korea. We negotiated with 
Stalin and Mao. Why aren't we talking with Iran?"37 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will first examine the current crisis in Iraq as it pertains to its 
neighbors, Iran and Saudi Arabia, using the paradigm of balance of power theory.38 
According to this theory, states are predisposed to balance their security against 
neighboring states. For many years, Iraq served as the buffer between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. However, since the fall of Iraq and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are posturing to improve their security and power relative to the region. 
In order to identify potential courses of action for the U.S. with regard to the two states, 
this thesis will review a few instances that highlight U.S.-Iran and U.S. Saudi relations. 
                                                 
35  Ted Galen Carpenter, "Talk to Iran; it's Working with N. Korea," OC Register, 
http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/korea-north-nuclear-1784725-iran-states (August 7, 2007). 
36  David Phillips, "Pragmatism Needed in U.S.-Iran Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6841> (August 7, 2007).  
37  Andre de Nesnera, "Experts Urge Direct U.S.-Iranian Talks to Resolve Nuclear Issue," Voice of 
America, April 28, 2006, <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/2006-04-28-
voa52.cfm?CFID=186491434&CFTOKEN=96178073> (August 8, 2007).  
38 Balance of power theory is being applied as a sub-theorem of neorealism and, in particular, 
offensive realism in which both Iran and Saudi Arabia seek the optimization of power at the other’s 
expense  even if they contend to seek power strictly for defensive purposes and to balance against the threat 
posed by the other.  
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This thesis will examine: Operation Ajax in which the CIA supported a coup to install a 
pro-Western leader in Iran; the U.S. support of Iran during the reign of the Shah; the 
“Twin Pillars” policy of Nixon; U.S. overt support of Iraq and covert support of Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War; and U.S. support of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War. Finally, the 
thesis will examine the steps Iran and Saudi Arabia are currently taking to address their 
security concerns. The conclusion of this work hopes to provide a clear idea of what U.S. 
foreign policy should be with regard to Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
This thesis will examine the works of academics, journalists, historians as well as 
insight from think tanks and the Congressional Research service. Articles from current 
newspapers, journals and magazines will be necessary in order to reflect indications of 
current policy.  
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II. APPLYING BALANCE OF POWER THEORY IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST SYSTEM 
 The 1979 Islamic Revolution and subsequent eight year conflict with Iraq 
depleted Iran’s economic and military power and stripped the state of its regional 
hegemon status.39 However, after 9/11 and President Bush’s inclusion of the state in his 
‘Axis of Evil’ speech, Iran re-emerged as a player on the international stage. The current 
conflict in Iraq has further provided Tehran with the opportunity to establish itself as a 
regional power. To counter Tehran’s attempts to gain influence in the region, Riyadh has 
ramped up its own efforts to establish a greater presence in Iraq. As a result, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are currently engaged in a classic power balancing struggle in which both 
states seek enhanced regional power and influence. Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 
insistence on making Iran a nuclear state and his continual defiance of the international 
community further adds to the turmoil between the regional powers. This turmoil has 
global implications because, as balance of power theory suggests, a nuclear armed Iran 
will compel Saudi Arabia, and possibly other states in the region, to balance against the 
threat posed by Iran and will ignite an arms race in a highly volatile region. Therefore, in 
order to apply a predictive analysis for makers of U.S. foreign policy, it is prudent to 
examine balance of power theory’s relevance to the current security dilemma that exists 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
 This chapter will define the system in which Iran and Saudi Arabia exist and will 
relate the assumptions required of balance of power theory. Close analysis of the 
assumptions and their relevance to the two states will show that balance of power theory 
correctly applies to the current paradigm. The chapter will also set forth the views of 
three leading proponents of balance of power theory, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, 
and Stephan Walt, and will define their models of offensive realism, defensive realism, 
and balancing, respectively. A review of balance of power theory and the states’ 
                                                 
39 Chapter IV will provide greater background regarding Iran’s status as a global power and its ties to 
the United States.  
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application of the principles established by Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Walt will allow for 
a predictive analysis that can then be applied to the current crisis in the Middle East.  
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to begin, it is necessary to define balance of power as parity between 
competing states and their perceived relative military, economic, or political power, the 
achievement of which should promote stability. Thus, balance of power theory suggests 
that where a perceived disparity exists between competing states, a struggle will ensue to 
acquire power at the other’s expense; historically, that struggle has resulted in war. 
Inherent in balance of power theory are several assumptions that establish the 
framework’s relevance within the examined system. The restated assumptions are as 
follows:  
• States are principal actors in the system;  
• The system is characterized by anarchy in which survival is the primary 
goal;  
• The accepted behavior of states in an anarchic system is “self-help” and 
states “must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements 
they can make for themselves;”40  
• States can never be sure about other states’ intentions and thus their 
behavior is influenced mainly by their external environment;  
• The international system “comprises independent political units (states) 
that have no central authority above them;”41 and lastly,  
• States within the system are rational actors. 
1. States as Principal Actors 
In order to be used as a predictive tool, balance of power theory requires that great 
power states are the principal actors in the system.42 As a point of reference, the U.S. and 
Soviet Union are the most recent and arguably the most prominent examples of great 
power states that, for nearly half a century engaged in the struggle to balance against each 
other. The U.S. and now defunct Soviet Union were global hegemons whose combined 
                                                 
40  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111. 
41  Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 10. 
42  In their books, Waltz and Mearsheimer address the assumptions necessary to render the theory 
useful. See Waltz, 118 and Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29-31. 
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economic, cultural, military, and political influence was ubiquitous in the international 
system. In contrast, despite the possession of a good portion of the world’s oil reserves, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s hegemony in the traditional sense exists mainly within the 
region. Nevertheless, a balance of power is only possible between two states that possess 
substantial power, real or imaginary, which certainly qualifies Iran and Saudi Arabia 
within the Middle East system. 
Because sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations have 
restricted its economic prowess, Iran’s power is derived mainly from its military 
posturing. Iran’s recent history is replete with examples of its attempts to establish itself 
as a regional military power. In addition to its status as the primary sponsor of 
international terrorism, Iran has played a prominent role in contributing to the instability 
in Iraq. Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi militia receives much of its support and guidance from 
inside Iran. Additionally, there are multiple reports of armed factions within Iraq 
receiving training and weaponry from Iran and numerous weapons caches found with 
labels linking them to the Iranian military.43 In March 2007, fifteen British sailors and 
Marines, whose boat reportedly strayed into Iranian waters while on patrol in the Shatt al 
Arab waterway, were detained in Tehran for nearly two weeks. In January 2008, five 
Iranian boats harassed and provoked three U.S. warships as they passed through the 
Straits of Hormuz. The incident evoked a harsh warning from President Bush who also 
lodged a formal complaint with Iran through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. Finally, the 
November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated with “high confidence” that 
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and President Ahmadinejad contends 
that Iran’s nuclear program is strictly for energy.44 Nevertheless, President Ahmadinejad 
has railed against the international community for its tacit support of Israel’s nuclear 
                                                 
43 For a more detailed list of Iran’s meddling in Iraq, see Kenneth Katzman, Iran's Influence in Iraq, 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 9, 2007). 
44  National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence 
Estimate, November 2007, <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf> (January 8, 2008) 
6. 
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weapons program which he considers a threat to Iranian sovereignty.45 He contends that 
Iran should be permitted to defend itself and a nuclear weapon would be the ultimate 
deterrent to aggression. The amassed effect of Iran’s actions indicate Iran’s objective of 
becoming a dominant regional military and political power. 
As Iran’s primary regional competitor, Saudi Arabia’s power is less derived from 
its military strength and more from the regime’s religious role as the ‘Custodian of the 
Two Holy Mosques’ as well as the state’s economic power as the possessor of more than 
20 percent of the world’s proven petroleum reserves.46 The Saudi ruler’s role as the 
‘Custodian’ is critical to the regime’s religious authority and influence amongst the 
world’s Muslim population. However, the regime has been the subject of numerous 
protests, demonstrations, and terrorist attacks for what is perceived as hypocrisy amongst 
the royal family that run contrary to strict Islamic teachings, that which the Wahhabi sect 
espouses. To counter the criticism, the regime has invested millions of dollars in 
preserving the Mosques and enhancing the hajj experience within its borders, all in 
attempt to further cement its religious authority and quell the internal threat.  
It should be surprising that Saudi Arabia, a country that from 1999-2006 bought 
over $14.3 billion in arms from the U.S., more than any other country in the world.  
Despite this record, Saudi Arabia is still not considered a major military power.47 Riyadh 
has been very successful in contracting out its defense against external threats, a point 
                                                 
45 For his part, President Ahmadinejad has made several public speeches condemning Israel and 
denouncing the holocaust as a fabrication. For a list of his remarks, see Hussein D. Hassan, Iran: Profile 
and Statements of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
January 16, 2007). 
46  U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "The 2008 World Factbook: Saudi Arabia," April 15, 2008, 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html> (March 30, 2008). 
47  Richard F. Grimmett, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 1999-
2006, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 20, 2007). Aside from Israel, Saudi 
Arabia has been the United States’ most dedicated and discriminating purchasers of U.S. military 
technology. The Middle East has long been the recipient of American military might but since 1986 Saudi 
Arabia has spent over $70billion on the most modern and deadly weapons the United States has in its 
arsenal, with a spike in purchased occurring around 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and more weapons 
were purchased for defense of the Arabian Peninsula. For more, see Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional 
Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 
29, 1994). Additionally, in 2007, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed to an arms deal worth over $20 billion 
dollars. David S. Cloud, "U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia," The New York Times, sec. A; 
Foreign Desk, July 28, 2007. 
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that will be expanded on later in the chapter. Indeed, the five branches of Saudi Arabia’s 
military are focused first on combating the internal threat posed by anti-regime Islamic 
extremists and a distant second on regional threats posed by Yemen, Iraq, and Iran. 
Internally, the five branches of the military as well as the robust intelligence, 
paramilitary, and police forces are each ruled by senior members of the al Saud family 
and are part of an intricate system of checks and balances employed by the regime to 
ensure that no single branch of the military gains too much power and attempts to 
overthrow the king. Rather than conventional military might, Saudi Arabia’s real strength 
exists in its ability to employ the oil weapon for vast economic wealth.48 
In 1973, in a show of solidarity with its Muslim brothers over the crisis in Israel, 
Saudi Arabia cut off most its Western consumers from oil which initiated a global crisis 
and demonstrated to the world just how strong Saudi Arabia, the former client-state of the 
U.S., had become. Following the end of the embargo in which prices increase 300%, the 
market did not rebound but rather the price continued to increase giving Saudi Arabia and 
other oil producing states significant wealth. With the world’s largest proven oil reserves, 
Saudi Arabia is also able to alter the world’s oil production and thus affect the price of 
oil. As the world’s largest consumer of oil, the U.S. has appealed to the Saudis to employ 
this capability on a number of occasions. Currently, Saudi Arabia is strengthening 
economic ties with Russia and China in an effort to attract more foreign investment and 
expand its consumer base to non-western markets, an indication that perhaps Riyadh no 
longer holds its relationship with Washington in the same regard as it did just a few years 
ago when the threat of Saddam Hussein loomed large. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is still 
beholding to the U.S. for its defense and the U.S. continues to serve as guardian of the 
flow of the world’s oil out of the region. 
2. The Anarchic System 
The system examined in this work is regional vice international, however, the 
Middle East system is no less anarchic and prone to belligerence than the international 
                                                 
48 Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Saudi National Security: Military and Security Services- 
Challenges & Developments, Full Report, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Working Draft: Revised September 30, 2004), 
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sns_military.pdf> (March 30, 2008). 
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system as balance of power theory assumes. Indeed, the Middle East, with most of the 
world’s proven oil reserves yet with scarce other resources, is subject to substantial 
competition among the states. As such, anarchy is pervasive and compels states to seek 
power at each other’s expense. However, in the Middle East, it is religious ideologies that 
spark tensions and heighten the already insatiable demand for power.  
The Sunni-Shi’a divide is the source of tremendous animosity between the 
regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran. With survival being a state’s primary goal in an 
anarchic system, Saudi Arabia and Iran are constantly competing for power at each 
other’s expense. Saudi Arabia is the most powerful player in a coalition of Sunni states 
that includes most of the Arabian Peninsula and has united in fear against the ‘Shi’a 
crescent’ of states led by Iran and includes Syria and Lebanon to a lesser extent. This 
helps to explain why Riyadh and Tehran have such an interest in Iraq, a state that had 
been secular under Baathist rule.49 The states are competing not only for influence in Iraq 
but also for resources and to reclaim religious superiority and hegemony that was absent 
during the Ba’ath Party’s rule. However, Iran’s quest for power and its nuclear ambitions 
have raised the bar. In 2006, in response to the threat posed by Iran and under the same 
auspices espoused by President Ahmadinejad that their programs will be peaceful, all six 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of Arab States announced their 
intention to develop nuclear energy.50  
3. “Self-Help” and External Influences 
The GCC states’ effort to develop nuclear energy is an example of how states in a 
system marked by anarchy attempt to engage in self-help; that is to say that they “rely on 
the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.”51 This 
                                                 
49 According to the CIA 2008 World Factbook, Iraq is comprised of 60-65% Shi’a and 32-37% Sunni 
Muslims. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "The 2008 World Factbook: Iraq," April 15, 2008 
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Glover, "Sunni States' Fears of Iran Trigger Middle East Nuclear Race," World Politics Review, November 
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51  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111.  
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assumption is arguable in a regional system considering that true self-help means that 
weak states which are struggling for survival can not be locked in a balance of power 
because a stronger state or superpower could come to the aid of the weak state or, 
through sanctions, deny it the use of any instrument that would serve its purpose.52 
However, in an essay on the regional balances of power in the Middle East, Benjamin 
Miller proposes that to allay this assumption it must be recognized that “regional 
balances of power depend on the way great powers are engaged in regional systems.”53  
To be sure, throughout the twentieth century the United States was the patron to 
client-states Iran and Saudi Arabia and formed its ‘Twin Pillars’ policy around the two 
states in order to foster stability in the region. However, Saudi Arabia is now the weak 
state that receives support from the superpower, the United States, to deter external 
threats. In 1990, Riyadh was concerned by the threat posed by Iraq and contracted out its 
external defense to the United States, a diplomatic maneuver Mearsheimer calls “external 
balancing.”54 The United States continues to exert its influence in the region primarily 
through its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which, according to the self-help assumption, 
contradicts the application of balance of power theory to the situation between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. It is Benjamin Miller’s contention that “only when the great powers 
disengage from a particular region is an autonomous regional system able to arise.”55 As 
if attempting to fulfill this model, Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from its Western ties 
even as it signs a multi-billion dollar arms deal. In a speech given at the Arab League 
summit meeting in March 2007, King Abdullah stated that “the American occupation of 
Iraq is illegal.”56 He also warned that constant instability in the region renders them 
subject to foreign, particularly U.S., intervention. The Saudi regime recognizes that its 
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links to the West inherently tie it to Israel, a point that is heretical for the regime which 
stakes its legitimacy on strict Islamic teachings and an aversion of Judaism.  
Conversely, Iran has been without the support of a patron state since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution the cataclysmic event that severed the ties between Tehran and 
Washington. The fall of the Soviet Union a decade later assured that Iran remained 
without a sponsor. It is in that regard that Iran fits the category of a state endeavored to 
self-help. However, Iran’s support of international terrorism has rendered it a target of 
economic sanctions and thus it is adversely affected by the great powers of the 
international system. The international community, in particular the United States, is 
committed to the denial of those tools which would serve Iran’s purpose. Tehran’s 
reaction to these external influences is to engage in “internal balancing.”57  Since the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran has increased its militant posture through the conventional 
operations mentioned above and through its persistent push for nuclear power. Indeed, 
Kenneth Waltz asserts that nuclear power is the ultimate balancing weapon and its 
development is the purest example of a state inclined to self-help.58 After all, as the 
leading protagonist of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer, states, “in the nuclear age, 
great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as 
well as formidable forces.”59 
According to Mearsheimer, and demonstrated by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the 
examples above, states can never be sure about other states’ intentions and thus their 
behavior is influenced by their external environment.60 Hence, the Middle East is 
entrenched in the security dilemma in which states that are “unsure of another’s [states] 
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intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion.”61 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in an arms race as they seek to balance against the 
power of the other by buying more arms or developing advanced weapons technology. 
This unrelenting pursuit of power defined the bipolar world for fifty years and 
contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union but only after populating the globe with 
weapons that could destroy the earth several times over. The arms race between the 
United States and Soviet Union is the classic example of a security dilemma played out in 
the international system between great power states. However, a precedent exists for the 
security dilemma to reach nuclear proportions between regional powers.  
Rooted in religion and illustrated by the current dispute over Kashmir, India and 
Pakistan have been arch rivals for decades. In the 1970s, Pakistan and India initiated their 
nuclear programs and early on it appeared that India had the edge when it tested its first 
nuclear weapon in 1974. Nearly twenty five years later, the regional arms race reached its 
apogee when, in 1998, India conducted two major tests and was followed just days later 
by Pakistan which conducted six tests officially announcing its ascension into the nuclear 
community. Pakistan was compelled by India’s early success to balance against its power 
much like Iran’s current push for nuclear weapons compels its regional rival to seek 
alliances or purchase arms that would balance against Iran’s resurgent power. These 
states exist in a system that is prone to anarchy, and thus are compelled to engage in self-
help; and because they react to the environment around them, they seek power, often at 
the expense of their competitors, and aim to prevent rivals from gaining power at its 
expense.62 Because for many years the Cold War defined the international system, 
regional conflicts were, in effect, proxy wars between the two superpowers making the 
tension between Pakistan and India an anomaly. Although the international system lacked 
a central authority over the two superpowers, their hegemonic influence served in that 
capacity for most regional systems and protected states from each another. 
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4. The Lack of a Central Authority 
As close to a central authority that currently exists, the United Nations seeks to 
ensure, “by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force 
shall not be used, save in the common interest.”63 Additionally, since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the United States has remained as the world’s last superpower and 
exercises its authority as the largest consumer in and principal defender of the global 
economy on which the international system depends. Indeed, during the strife between 
Pakistan and India, Washington reacted to the nuclear tests by halting U.S. aid to both 
states and imposing economic sanctions in attempt to prevent the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the region. However, neither the U.N. nor the U.S. could prevent the 
states from seeking power at the other’s expense. The two states retained their nuclear 
arsenals and Washington has since opened up relations with both states.64  
In its Twin Pillars policy, the United States exercised its hegemony over Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, two diametrically opposed regional powers, and maintained a tenuous 
stability throughout the 1970s. Because Iran’s geographic location proximate to the 
Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia’s oil supply were critically and strategically important to 
the United States’ relevance as a global power and as a balance to the Soviets, the “policy 
relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia to serve as the two key protectors of U.S. interests” in the 
region.65 As such, in addition to arming them as the bulwark of its anti-Soviet policy in 
the region, Washington was endeavored to serve as arbiter between the natural enemies 
and ensure that the two states were appropriately balanced against each other.  
In 1979, however, Islamic fundamentalists led the revolution that ended the 
patron-client relationship between Washington and Tehran and disavowed the notion that 
the United States was the central authority in the regional system. Furthermore, because 
of its continued support of international terrorism and rejection of U.N. Security Council 
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resolutions, Iran is an anathema to the international system in which the United Nations 
serves as the de facto central authority. The further Iran alienates itself, the more it will 
engage in self-help and be inclined to develop the ultimate defensive weapon. Indeed, 
Iran’s Foreign Minister recently issued a statement declaring that its military is “strictly 
defensive [in] nature and serves stability and security in the region.”66 However, Iran’s 
defiance of international norms comes at the expense of its own security and threatens 
regional stability. President Ahmadinejad’s comments regarding Israel render Iran a 
pariah among the international community except by those states which indulge in the 
same ideological beliefs, a point which calls into question Iran’s rationality. 
5. Rational Actors 
Critical to any discussion on balance of power theory and its predictive value is 
whether or not states are rational actors.67 That is to say, do states conform to the 
assumptions listed above and are they motivated by their survival as well as the quest for 
power at the expense of all others; or are they led by religious ideologues motivated by 
messianic impulses whose interest in the earthly realm is merely preparation for an 
otherworldly existence. It is arguable that Islamic Fundamentalism is considered rational 
within the parameters of Islam and the teachings of Muhammad. However, within the 
scope of the international system dominated by secularism, on which most Western 
governments are founded, religious ideologues—Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or 
otherwise—inherently lack rationality.  
Despite having theocratic governments based in Shari’a Law which would 
presuppose irrationality, historically, the Saudi and Iranian regimes (the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution notwithstanding) have behaved rationally in order to preserve the state and 
                                                 
66  RIA Novosti, "Iran Accuses Bush of Trying to Destabilize Persian Gulf," Russian News and 
Information Agency, March 4, 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20080403/102906079.html> (April 3, 2008). 
67 For more on the rational actors, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, in Essence of Decision, offer 
an exhaustive analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the decision-making process that nearly led the 
world to nuclear war. In the book, Allison concluded that “actors” or governments, evaluate a set of goals 
and, as rational decision-makers, choose the goal with the highest reward. See Graham T. Allison, Essence 
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 1999). In his book, The 
Silent Language, Edward Hall examines “the ways in which man reads meaning into what other men do.” 
Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language, (Anchor, 1973), 51. Both books endeavor to explain more about 
rational actor theory than this thesis is prepared to do. 
 26
advance their respective power within the international system. However, the imbroglio 
in Iraq has altered the status quo and necessitates a reexamination of the regimes’ recent 
comments and actions in order to determine if Saudi Arabia and Iran are behaving 
rationally. Only then will strategists know if the assumptions prerequisite to the 
application of balance of power theory are relevant and then be able to apply analytical 
rigor to the development of courses of action in response to the implications the theory 
posits. 
An examination of Riyadh actions reveal that it is adept at playing power politics 
to placate critics while acknowledging its ideological basis in order to stem internal 
criticism. This dichotomy renders Saudi Arabia in a perpetual condition of unrest 
whereby peace is maintained only through the cooptation and coercion of the population 
bought through rents collected from the state’s vast oil wealth. The regime though, is 
shrewd in its assessment of the duplicitous nature of its relationship with the West and its 
potentially perilous position. Although Riyadh realizes that the patron-client relationship 
it enjoys with Washington is critical to its staying power, since its employment of the oil 
weapon in 1973, the regime is skillful at recognizing when it is appropriate to engage in 
power politics in order to appease its internal critics. Meanwhile, the regime’s religious 
authority, exercised in the form of oppressive fatwa and enforced by the domineering 
mutaween, is exploited primarily to stifle potential domestic uprisings. Indicative of a 
state that behaves rationally in order to ensure its very survival, the al-Saud family 
balances its internal and external conflicts by deft vacillation between religious state and 
political power player. 
Contrary to Saudi Arabia, the question of Iran’s rationality is much more 
nebulous and subject to interpretation because of its affinity to act in accordance with 
religious principles. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Tehran’s interest in global politics 
has been motivated primarily by its reincarnation as a state led by an Islamic 
fundamentalist regime. As such, fundamentalist doctrine demands that all kafir states be 
destroyed and the world thrown into chaos in anticipation for the return of the Twelfth 
Imam, known as the Mahdi, who upon his return will lead his oppressed followers into a 
universal peace “and usher in a perfect Islamic society in which truth and justice 
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prevail.”68 The apocalyptic overtones are indeed alarming but, similarities to Christianity 
aside, this agenda as a matter of state policy is inherently dangerous whether or not it is 
apocryphal. Indeed, a review of actions and comments from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad 
will show that there is ample proof to support Iran’s commitment to this notion.  
When Khomeini returned from exile to assume a leadership role in post-
revolutionary Iran, in addition to assuming the title ‘imam,’ his followers used messianic 
symbols and language to empower Khomeini. In The Shia Revival, Vali Nasr explains the 
title imam and its opposing connotations between Sunni and Shia Muslims.  
In Sunni Islam, the title ‘imam’ simply means leader “as in those who lead 
prayers at a local mosque. For the Shia by contrast, it is a much more 
evocative term, conjuring up images of Ali and his eleven 
descendants…In Iran, references to ‘Imam Khomeini’ not only raised him 
above other Ayatollahs but equated him with the saints.69 
Nasr goes on to assert that Khomeini and his followers’ actions were specifically 
designed to evoke the return of the Twelfth Imam and to frame support for the revolution 
and the republic it founded as a choice between “absolute good and absolute evil.”70 
Capitalizing on his self-created religious authority and building on the success of the 
revolution, Khomeini extended his reach beyond Iran and initiated a global Islamic 
movement. Fundamentalist organizations throughout the region received financial 
support and spiritual guidance from Tehran and executed Khomeini’s will in which 
Israeli and American interests were targeted.  
After Khomeini’s death in 1989, Iran continued to provide support to these 
organizations but newly elected President Rafsanjani toned down the Islamist rhetoric as 
he was most concerned with recovering from the economically and militarily damaging 
Iran-Iraq War. Indeed, in sharp contrast from the anti-capitalist and anti-western rhetoric 
espoused by Khomeini, Rafsanjani and his successor, Mohammad Khatami, advocated a 
free market economy as the cure to Iran’s ails and won their elections on the promise of 
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liberalizing the economy. However, in 2005, with the economy still floundering, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was able to win the presidency on a populist grassroots 
campaign that appealed to the poor. Whereas Rafsanjani and Khatami maintained a 
conservative Islamist approach to foreign affairs, Ahmadinejad’s term as president has 
been mired with foreign policy issues underscored by the return to fundamentalism and 
messianic impulses.  
At the UN, in his first speech to the General Assembly in 2005, President 
Ahmadinejad articulated, among other things, Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a peaceful 
endeavor and, without specifically naming names, criticized those states that would 
prevent Iran from achieving that goal. Ahmadinejad denounced “those hegemonic 
powers, who consider scientific and technological progress of independent and free 
nations as a challenge to their monopoly on these instruments of power.”71 The speech 
was interlaced with messianic innuendo and culminated with a prayer to “hasten the 
emergence of…that one that will fill this world with justice and peace.”72 In a harbinger 
of the scornful rhetoric that was to come, Ahmadinejad attempted to establish Iran as a 
peaceful nation and “a true symbol of democracy” and accused the United States of 
violating the nuclear proliferation treaty by arming the “Zionist occupation regime.”73  
Since his speech at the General Assembly, President Ahmadinejad’s contempt for 
Israel is well-documented. Speaking at a press conference in Saudi Arabia, he claimed 
the holocaust was a “myth” and later called for Israel to be “wiped off the map.”74 
Ahmadinejad has since been told by Ayatollah Khamenei to curtail the inflammatory 
rhetoric not because he does not share the same ideals but because the Ayatollah fears 
internal disruptions between Iranian conservatives and reformists. Nevertheless, 
Ahmadinejad’s comments are cause for alarm and are especially disconcerting when it is 
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considered that Iran is actively pursuing technology that could cause Israel to vanish as is 
his hope and prophecy upon the return of the Mahdi.  
Ahmadinejad is convinced that the ‘Hidden Imam’ will return in his time and has 
steered his policies to reflect that belief. So much so that, in a speech before congress he 
stated that Iran “should define [its] economic, cultural, and political policies based on the 
Imam Mahdi’s return;” and, according to his former first deputy, Parvis Davoudi, 
Ahmadinejad asked his cabinet members to pledge “their allegiance to the Mahdi in a 
signed letter.”75 This story was also cited on a Farsi-language news website Entekhab 
which later stated that Ahmadinejad’s quest for nuclear power is intended to assist in 
creating “an atmosphere of global turmoil to signify that the Mahdi will come soon” and 
lead the world to justice and peace.76 Ahmadinejad’s perspectives have been the source 
of criticism from theologians and former officials alike who claim that he is using 
religion and provoking the United States in order to engender support from the 
population where his popularity is waning due to his domestic economic failures.77 
Nonetheless, his religious rants laced with apocalyptic suggestion are enticing the equally 
theologically motivated Bush administration into confrontation, a point that begs the 
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question of Ahmadinejad’s rationality.78 Critics of this assessment, however, deny 
Ahmadinejad as irrational and claim that his anti-Zionist rhetoric and saber rattling 
toward the U.S. and U.N. are part of his carefully crafted plan to invoke nationalist 
fervor. 
In his book entitled, Treacherous Alliance, Trita Parsi asserts that, since 1979, 
Tehran has used ideology to successfully achieve its nationalist objectives as well as 
realize regional superiority and global relevance.79 As such, Khomeini and Ahmadinejad 
invoked fundamentalism in order to rally support from within during the revolution and, 
later, to distance Iran from those states believed to be surrogates of the West. As natural 
adversaries of the Sunni Arabs, Tehran is inclined to provide for the defense of the Shi’a 
in the region, which, with consideration to Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the nuclear armed 
U.S. and Israel’s nuclear weapons program, justifies Iran’s quest for nuclear power. 
However, Iran has been pragmatic in its quest as indicated in the December 2007 NIE. 
Demonstrating a concern that it would be next on President Bush’s list of countries to 
invade, the report notes that Iran succumbed to “international pressure” and suspended its 
nuclear program shortly after the U.S. invaded Iraq.80 Parsi and other critics of 
Washington’s aggressive approach to Iran suggest that Iran’s suspension of its nuclear 
program under the threat of its very survival indicates a pragmatic realism that belies 
irrationality. However, the suspension occurred before the ideologically motivated 
Ahmadinejad came into power and intelligence estimates would not discount the 
complete termination of a nuclear weapons program.  
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Others that support the notion that Iran has embraced realism argue that a nuclear 
weapons program is an expected and natural reaction to the military threat posed to it by 
Israel and the United States and politically and economically by Saudi Arabia.81 What 
has developed is the ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemma in which it needs to be determined if 
Iran is a threat to regional stability because of its pursuit of nuclear powers and Islamic 
fundamentalist roots. Or if Iran believes it needs nuclear weapons to serve as the ultimate 
deterrent to regional adversaries bolstered by the formidable United States which has 
clearly stated its ire for Tehran’s policies and ideological principles. With regard to the 
other assumptions listed above and based largely on Iran’s reactions to the external 
influences on its sovereignty, it would appear that Iran’s behavior is consistent with 
realism and balance of power theory; therefore, it must be considered rational behavior. 
The variable, however, is President Ahmadinejad who continues to spew his scornful 
rhetoric laced with messianic and apocalyptic messages. Trita Parsi argues that this is 
deliberate and Ahmadinejad is nothing more than good theater and that his vitriol has 
strategic motivations. Nonetheless, with tensions in the region as high as they are, 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations can incite adverse consequences. Regional 
power players, whether they believe the threat is real or an act, will undoubtedly feel 
compelled to balance against it as suggested by neorealism and balance of power theory.  
B. PROPONENTS OF BALANCE OF POWER THEORY 
With the assumptions established and their relevance applied to the paradigm, this 
chapter will now turn its attention to balance of power theory and three protagonists 
whose discourses on the subject define the parameters in which power states behave. To 
that end, it is hoped that the examination of the distinct but related theories will offer 
predictive conclusions for the Middle East as the regional power states, Saudi Arabia and 
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Iran, contend with one another in the post-Saddam environment. John Mearsheimer 
presents offensive realism as an alternative to Kenneth Waltz’ defensive realism, while 
Steven Walt’s primary focus remains on states’ tendency to engage in balancing 
behavior. 
1. Mearsheimer – Offensive Realism 
The bedrock principle of John Mearsheimer’s work on offensive realism is his 
belief that status quo powers do not exist in any system; rather, power states are “always 
searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final 
goal.”82 This is critical to understanding offensive realism because it puts the impetus on 
power states to proactively seek power regardless of other states’ intentions. As such, 
Mearsheimer believes that a system in which there are multiple competitors for power is 
far more dangerous than a bipolar world. This is especially true when one of the states 
engages in a quest for hegemonic power. As the state approaches hegemony, its power 
relative to others in the system is a stabilizer because no other states in the system are 
strong enough to pose a threat. However, this gap in power could lead the weaker states 
in the system to engage in alliances and balance against the hegemon. The constant 
struggle for power at the expense of others results in the aforementioned security 
dilemma of states and defines the current situation in the Middle East.  
In the centuries preceding the formation of Saudi Arabia as it is known today the 
al-Saud family’s history of exercising military might to impose its dominion over 
potential adversaries throughout the Arabian Peninsula is well-documented. In the 
twentieth century, however, the modernization that empowered Europe overlooked the 
Middle East and the region was colonized by the militarily stronger West. After World 
War II and colonization succumbed to nationalization, the region was never fully 
industrialized and security was outsourced, primarily to the United States. With militaries 
that were primarily defensive in nature, the Middle East states possessed one viable 
offensive weapon in their arsenal. The 1973 oil crisis demonstrated to the world just how 
powerful and critically important the region had become to the global economy. As such, 
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Riyadh effectively employed the oil weapon to achieve its economic and political goals. 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s ability to influence the price of oil renders it the most dominant 
economic force in the region and a regional hegemon. Because its influence extends 
throughout the global economy on which the U.S. draws its power, Washington is 
therefore compelled to provide Saudi Arabia protection from external threats. 
Although Iran also benefitted from employment of the oil weapon, the 1979 
revolution and war with Iraq the following year prevented it from establishing itself as an 
economic power. However, although economically damaging, those watershed events 
helped define Iran as the political and military power it is today. As the leading Shi’a 
state in the region, Iran is compelled to serve as the balance to the predominantly Sunni 
regimes that are largely aligned to the West. Because sanctions continue to limit Iran 
from developing economic relations with most Western countries, Tehran has opened 
relations with China and India, two states that desperately need Iran’s energy resource 
and do not carry the same political baggage as the United States.  Additionally, because 
Saudi Arabia is protected by the dominant U.S. military, Tehran is obliged to expand its 
military as well as provide support to those agents that execute its intent through proxy 
conflicts aimed at weakening the U.S.-Saudi alliance. Indeed, its involvement in Iraq as 
well as its current quest for nuclear power is certainly attributable to Tehran’s desire to 
expand its military power at the expense of its Sunni neighbor. Thus, offensive realism 
supports that a nuclear Iran virtually ensures its survival and makes it the most powerful 
state in the region.  
Although Mearsheimer believes that a bipolar world is safer than a system of 
multi-polarity, he recognizes the potential for an arms race as each state competes for 
power at the others expense. This prescient point was made evident last summer when 
Washington announced a $20 billion arms deal to provide Saudi Arabia with advanced 
weaponry while other Middle East states seek to balance against a nuclear armed Iran 
with their own nuclear programs. Although the former circumstance in an unfortunate 
consequence, Kenneth Waltz, and proponents of defensive realism, argue that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons actually contributes to stability. 
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2. Waltz – Defensive Realism 
Whereas Mearsheimer asserts that an anarchic system compels states to seek 
power, Waltz claims that states, being defensive in nature, merely aim to survive and, 
therefore, must first seek security. Certainly this involves awareness of shifts in power 
since the struggle for security implies maintenance of the status quo. As such, self-help 
states that act defensively are forced to obtain power in order to balance against a 
perceived threat and return to a stable system. In this sense, if Iran believes it is 
threatened by the United States or even Israel, its pursuit of nuclear weapons is consistent 
with defensive realism. To this end, Waltz believes that the spread of nuclear weapons as 
the ultimate deterrent would actually lead to a more stable Middle East.  
In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, Waltz argues that the spread of 
nuclear weapons amongst power states serves as a deterrent to offensive behavior and, 
therefore, results in stability. Certainly the Bush Administration’s inclusion of Iran in the 
‘Axis of Evil’ and subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq gives Tehran reason to feel 
threatened. Furthermore, President Bush contends that a nuclear armed Iran is a threat to 
global security and has not ruled out a pre-emptive strike.83 As such, President 
Ahmadinejad asserts that Iran’s military is strictly a defensive force and recognizes that 
nuclear weapons would be the bulwark of its defensive posture. For this reason, it is no 
wonder he recently reported that Iran has not suspended its nuclear weapons program as 
the 2007 NIE stated but that it continues to move forward with the installation of 6000 
new uranium enriching centrifuges.84 Unfortunately, however, Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
have unintended consequences on the regional balance of power.  
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Faced with the new threat presented by its historic adversary, Saudi Arabia is 
compelled to balance against it. Since the invasion of Iraq, the two powers have engaged 
in a subtle balance of power game in which Iran is attempting to reestablish itself as an 
international power while Saudi Arabia attempts to stifle Iranian influence in the region. 
However, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions raised the stakes and threaten to launch the two 
powers into a nuclear arms race. In making his argument, Waltz recognizes states’ 
propensity to balance against one another and that “new nuclear states may come in 
hostile pairs.”85 In fact, it is not without precedent; the escalation of tensions between 
India and Pakistan presents clear evidence of the consequences of regional competitors 
and the quest for nuclear power. Thus, Washington is not simply concerned with the 
possibility of a nuclear armed and hostile Iran, it is also worried that nuclear weapons 
will proliferate throughout the historically unstable Middle East as the Sunni dominated 
region is forced to balance against the threat posed by Iran.  
3. Walt – Balance of Threat 
Critical to the examination of the Middle East system, Steven Walt offers an 
amendment to balance of power theory that attempts to explain why states will be 
compelled to balance against Iran. In support of Waltz’ theory that states are more 
defensive in nature, Walt argues that states do not balance against power but rather 
against a perceived threat. Inclusive of that perception is the state’s aggregate power as a 
sum of its population, technological prowess, and military and industrial capacity relative 
to others states in the system. Also included in Walt’s formula is a state’s offensive 
power and aggressive intentions. As such, Iran presents the greatest threat to stability in 
the region which is only intensified by its intentions to achieve nuclear status.86  
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Waltz contends that there are a number of reasons why Iran seeks nuclear 
weapons, not least of which is the achievement of regional hegemony.87 Because it is a 
Shi’a power and the primary state sponsor of international terrorism, Iran is an inherent 
threat to the region which is only amplified by its qualification as a revisionist state 
dissatisfied with its current station in the international system. In an article on regional 
balance of power, Benjamin Miller proposes that balancing should be the dominant 
feature of Middle East politics because most states in the system want to maintain the 
status quo and must curb the burgeoning hegemon before it becomes too strong and 
disrupts the system.88 Therefore, the closer Iran comes to achieving its nuclear aims, the 
other states in the region will be more compelled to balance against the threat. That is, of 
course, unless the United States, as the world’s remaining superpower, acts first.  
C.  IRAQ AS A TEST BED FOR APPLYING THE THEORY 
Inherent to every discussion about regional balance of power theory is how the 
great powers are engaged in regional systems. For over sixty years, the United States has 
been intimately involved in the Middle East and has had a tremendous impact on regional 
politics. Today, with the bulk of U.S. forces currently engaged in Iraq, that fact is no less 
true and the potential for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East rests heavily on 
Washington’s involvement. In the next two chapters, this paper will examine the impact 
of Washington’s influence on Iran and Saudi Arabia from the turn of the twentieth 
century up until the current imbroglio in Iraq. A thorough review is necessary to 
understand the political history that has resulted in the existing tensions. It will then be 
possible to examine the crisis in Iraq as a vehicle through which Iran is attempting to gain 
influence in the region at the expense of Saudi Arabia, and as a threat to regional and 
global stability.  
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III. SAUDI ARABIA 
Despite fundamental differences in the perception of liberty and basic human 
rights, the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been a marriage of 
convenience best described as Realpolitik. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a state founded 
on a strict Islamic fundamentalist doctrine and with a poor record of human rights, is 
among those few Middle East states that pose the least significant threat to the United 
States and has remained a loyal, albeit “problematic ally” in the region for decades.89 
What began as an economic partnership between U.S. oil companies and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia emerged as an alliance that served both governments. Saudi resources 
fueled the United States’ ascension to superpower status and in return, U.S. military 
power stood as guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s security. However, for much of the last sixty 
years, the United States framed its involvement in the Middle East first, in deference to 
its unflinching support for Israel, which Arabs consider the principal United States 
transgression and the root cause for the destabilization of the region; and second, within 
the context of the Cold War.  
The Cold War caused U.S. foreign policy makers to not only ignore Saudi abuses 
of human or civil rights, but also disregard second and third order implications of parallel 
U.S. policies with its Middle East neighbors, particularly, Iran. Thus, when the Cold War 
ended and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower, the effects of 
U.S. policies in the Middle East—which made sense in the realm of bipolar politics—
have come back to haunt the United States. The United States’ turbulent relationship vis-
à-vis Saudi Arabia and Iran threatens to upset the balance of power in the Middle East 
and launch the region into an arms race of nuclear repercussions. Because the U.S. was 
intimately involved in the formative processes that brought Saudi Arabia and Iran to 
power, it is undeniable that the U.S. will continue to impact the nature of the conflict. 
Thus, this chapter will review the history of Saudi Arabia’s regional hegemony as a 
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(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2007). 
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product of U.S. foreign policy up to the current crisis in Iraq in order to identify the 
potential impact on the balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
A. RISE TO HEGEMONY 
In contrast to Turkey and Iran, whose Ottoman and Persian Empires are among 
the earliest examples of government known to man, the Arabian Peninsula was 
comprised of nomads, transitory merchants, and religious zealots who presented no real 
threat and the land—aside from the caravan routes that extended from the Red Sea to 
India across the northern desert—was a barren wasteland of no strategic or economic 
value to non-Muslims. Because Islam has its roots in Mecca and Medina, on the 
peninsula’s western coast, the land has always been vitally important to Muslims, but it 
was not until oil was discovered that Saudi Arabia became relevant to the West. Soon 
after the discovery, Saudi Arabia became a strategic partner of the U.S. and a regional 
hegemon with profound global influence.   
1.  An Alliance Forms 
In 1940, the United States and Saudi Arabia opened full formal diplomatic 
relations with the focus on the development of oil drilling technology and education. 
However, the U.S. soon expanded the relationship and became the sole guarantor of 
Saudi Arabia’s security, albeit for a price. Upon the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. 
emerged as a burgeoning superpower with a superior military and a navy that could 
police international waters and protect the delivery of Saudi oil. In the U.S., the Saudis 
found a sponsor that brought the fledgling state out of poverty, set it on the path of 
affluence, and aided in its achievement as regional hegemon. In return, the U.S. benefited 
from Saudi Arabia’s influence within OPEC and its ability to affect the oil prices. Saudi 







market and thus, craft a mutually beneficial price. Despite the ideological divisiveness 
that exists between them, the U.S.-Saudi relationship was an example in realism of why 
states are encouraged to form alliances.90  
Because the U.S. was considered the stronger of the two states, it would seem that 
the Saudis were the main benefactor of the relationship. However, as a result of the 
alliance, the U.S. secured access to a vital resource, garnered a foothold in the region, and 
prevented competitors—particularly those with a geographic advantage over the U.S.—
from gaining influence in Saudi Arabia. A rising superpower and offensive in nature, the 
U.S. sought absolute power when making the alliance despite their fundamental political 
and ideological differences. In contrast, it was vital to the stability and growth of Saudi 
Arabia that it possessed a deterrent to any state that threatened it. Hence, the Saudis were 
simply trying to provide for their own security and acting defensively when they formed 
the alliance with the U.S. Over the next several years, the conditions that initially defined 
the alliance remained the same but its purpose changed in the post-WWII environment 
defined by global bipolarity. 
2. Eisenhower Doctrine 
In his treatise on alliances, Walt contends that comparatively weaker states are 
more inclined to forge alliances with those strong states that, although they may pose a 
threat and are ideologically opposed, are geographically separated.91 Although 
ideologically opposed to the U.S., the Saudis were hardly concerned with U.S. imperialist 
designs as long as an ocean separated them. The Saudis were concerned with the 
expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union whose proximity to the kingdom added to its 
potential as a threat to Saudi sovereignty. Besides, the Saudis abhorred Soviet 
                                                 
90 In his book The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt makes the point that states that are ideologically 
opposed are less likely to form alliances because they are “viewed with suspicion” and “intervening in the 
internal affairs of other countries will be more tempting when one believes that domestic characteristics 
exert a strong impact on a state’s international behavior.”  (pg 37) This is particularly relevant in the 
modern day U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship and how U.S. reaction to Soviet abuses of human rights or the 
U.S. relationship with Israel draws criticism from within and subjects the relationship to criticism that 
could alter the nature of the alliance without regard for why it was formed in the first place. For more, see 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 321. 
91  Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 23 and 33-40. 
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godlessness more than U.S. liberal secularism. Meanwhile, in the midst of McCarthyism 
and the ‘Red Scare,’ the United States and its allies in Europe could ill afford a situation 
in which its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was weakened by its dependence on 
foreign oil.  
In 1957, President Eisenhower adopted a new foreign policy vis-à-vis whereby 
the U.S. would intercede if it became apparent that the Soviets threatened the sovereignty 
of the region.92 Furthermore, the U.S. would engage in economic and military 
cooperation with the Middle East states; as such, Washington injected millions of dollars 
to pro-Western Arab states in order to increase their security and welfare and to ensure 
they would remain faithful to their customers in the West. It is undeniable that 
Washington adopted this policy in order to deny Moscow access to the resource rich 
environment. However, although the Middle East still ranked second to the United States 
in oil production, the West was growing increasingly dependent on the flow of oil from 
the region and could ill afford a Soviet incursion. The policy then, reflected a change in 
the dynamic between Washington and Riyadh. Because the Soviets could have filled the 
void left by the U.S., the region’s-in particular Tehran as the regional hegemon—
dependency on the U.S. for security was not as important as the West’s growing 
dependency on oil from the region. Consequently, the political advantage long enjoyed 
by the United States tipped in favor of Saudi Arabia and warned of the changing nature of 
the relationship. 
The U.S.-Saudi paradigm witnessed a shift in power as the kingdom’s function in 
U.S. foreign policy became more vital to its success. Whereas just twenty years before 
the Saudis were absolutely dependant on the U.S. for its growth and development, now, 
not only was the U.S. increasingly dependent on foreign oil, but it relied on the Saudis to 
be the bulwark of its anti-Communist policy in the Middle East. With the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, the U.S. cemented its commitment to the Middle East, in particular the pro-
West Arab states, and although it was the guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty, the 
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U.S. was sliding into a position of political weakness vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia; a position 
that was fully demonstrated during the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1973. 
3. The “Oil Weapon”  
The U.S.-Saudi alliance is primarily based in Saudi Arabia’s position as the 
world’s leading exporter of oil and America’s position as the world’s largest consumer of 
the same.93 As the largest contributor to the world’s oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is able to 
increase the supply and thus lower the price of oil. Subsequently, the United States has 
often appealed to the Saudis to keep prices low. The economic arrangement can be 
directly credited with growing the Saudis’ great wealth while enabling the United States 
to withstand the Soviet threat and succeed as the sole remaining superpower. While this 
formula served America well during the Cold War, critics argue that the United States is 
now in a position of dependency and that, in order to maintain its superpower status, 
policy makers are obliged to ignore ideological differences that would otherwise 
terminate the alliance. In Origin of Alliances, Walt identifies this phenomenon as the 
“monopoly supply of an important asset.” He states that “the more valuable the asset 
offered…the more effective the asset will be as an instrument of alliance formation.”94 
There was a time when demand for foreign oil was far less and thus, the U.S. obtained the 
economic and political advantage over the Saudis. However, America’s growing 
dependence on foreign oil and the Saudi’s influence on price gave Riyadh an advantage 
over Washington. The precarious nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship revealed itself in 
1973, when the Saudi regime employed the oil weapon in a demonstration of its rising 
power and influence.95 
The embargo’s purpose was to place pressure on the West for its unwavering 
support of Israel, the benchmark of Washington’s foreign policy in the Middle East. The 
                                                 
93  United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The USSR and the Arab Oil Weapon (Washington, 
D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, December 7, 1973), <http://www.foia.cia.gov> (December 29 2007). 
94  Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 43. 
95 The embargo was a show of support from the OPEC nations for Egypt and Syria and began shortly 
before their conflict with Israel. The embargo was intended to influence those nations that supported Israel 
and demonstrate the power they held over the global economy. 
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willingness of the Saudis to take action that directly targeted Washington demonstrated 
that it no longer conducted its foreign policy from a position of inferiority. Although, 
Israel managed to turn the tide of war which quickly resulted in the declaration of a 
ceasefire, the crisis that followed demonstrated a critical vulnerability in the Western 
alliance and a reduction of Washington’s influence in the Middle East. Most importantly 
for the Saudis though, the embargo further enhanced Saudi Arabia’s influence in the geo-
strategic realm and brought them closer to a position of political equity in the U.S.-Saudi 
alliance irrespective of the Cold War.  
Nevertheless, the oil crisis had a tremendous impact on the Cold War and 
Washington’s reaction was closely monitored by the Soviets. The Soviets viewed the 
embargo as an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East not for the sake of oil but 
rather to lessen American influence so close to its borders.96 Because the leading OPEC 
nations, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were conservative anti-communist governments—a 
fact which partially explains their loyalty to the west as the lesser of two evils—Moscow 
sought any means to establish credibility amongst the Arab nations. Moscow also saw an 
opportunity to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli conflict and damage, if not destroy, U.S. 
hegemony in the Middle East. Ironically, Soviet intercession actually strengthened U.S.-
Saudi ties by making them strategic partners. However, it did shift Washington’s 
approach toward the Middle East and ignited an otherwise dormant enmity between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia 
4. Cold War Consequences of the Oil Crisis  
As a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Moscow increased its commitment to the 
region, particularly to those states that, in the wake of World War II, were still 
undergoing anti-imperialist and nationalist change at the expanse of Western influence. 
Moscow sought revolutionary regimes that could be influenced by Soviet military and 
economic aid. As such, Egypt was first provided aid in 1955 followed by Syria, Iraq, 
                                                 
96 Because the Soviets had their own oil reserves and ranked among the world’s leaders in oil 
production, the OPEC decision to cut production did not affect the availability of oil in the Soviet bloc. In 
fact, the Soviets benefitted from the price increase and a rise in exports sent to Eastern European countries 
that had been partially supplied by OPEC. 
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Morocco, Yemen, as well as Iran which favored the West but engaged Moscow in order 
to foster its own ambitions in the Gulf in spite of Moscow’s support of its Arab clients.97 
Moscow’s support maintained pressure against conservative, pro-Western states like 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and certainly detracted from Western influence in the region. 
However, in the 1973 conflict, Moscow was reluctant to contribute in a direct manner 
because it realized that full support for the Arab cause could develop into a major 
international crisis and Moscow did not want to “adversely affect U.S.-Soviet détente.”98  
Nevertheless, Moscow’s continued support of revolutionary regimes 
demonstrated a commitment to the active destabilization of the region, and contributed to 
closer ties between Washington and conservative states, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Conservative states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were immune to Soviet influences 
because its philosophy and style of government was fundamentally contrarian to their 
own. Thus, the more Moscow attempted to gain influence in the region, the more Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait aligned with the United States.99  
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opposed to Western involvement. See United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet  Military Resupply 
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99 Muslim enmity for Moscow reached a tipping point in 1979 when, at the request of the pro-
communist Afghan regime, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in order to quell an Islamic Mujahideen 
insurgency. The rebellion attracted Muslim fighters from throughout the Arab world (most famously, of 
course, was Osama bin Laden) and came to symbolize the Islamic struggle over imperialist powers. Saudi 
Arabia provided the rebels with financial support and actively recruited jihadists for the effort. Meanwhile, 
the United States, as with most anti-communist movements, authorized covert operations credited with 
ensnaring Moscow into its version of the Vietnam War; that is, a quagmire that would exhaust already 
limited Soviet resources against an insuperable enemy. The decade long war in Afghanistan eventually 
contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union, a point that Jihadists proudly, but wrongly, assume credit for 
themselves. Nonetheless, the invasion, coupled with an anti-Western revolution in Iran and subsequent 
Iran-Iraq War, exposed Saudi Arabia’s relative insecurity and deemed it necessary that Riyadh ally with the 
United States in order to ensure the defense of the kingdom as well as protect the production and 
distribution of the world’s oil supply. 
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After the 1973 oil crisis, Riyadh maintained a public appearance of independence 
in order to disassociate itself from Washington and its support of Israel. Arab-Israeli 
tensions ensured that as long as the United States promoted its support of Israel, a U.S.-
Saudi alliance would invoke hostility from its Muslim neighbors. Throughout the 1970s, 
many Middle East states were susceptible to revolutionary, anti-West movements which, 
in turn, made Saudi Arabia vulnerable to opportunists that sought to exploit the oil-rich, 
but still militarily weak state. The invasion of Afghanistan only contributed to Riyadh’s 
heightened concern. Thus, despite the earlier confrontation, Saudi Arabia was dependant 
on the United States as the guarantor of its security. 
Because they were trusted allies, the Saudis earned favored status in the 
acquisition of U.S.-made military technology and training. As such, the appearance of a 
militarily strong Saudi Arabia served Washington’s interests in the region but also helped 
propel the kingdom into hegemon status within the Middle East. Subsequently, Saudi 
Arabia became a target of those states in the region that sought to balance against it. Iran, 
in particular, has a history of animosity toward the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula 
which dates to the Sassanid and Caliphate Empires’ struggle for regional dominance and 
exists today as the two countries represent a balance of power in the Middle East. As a 
result, the Middle East is primarily split along sectarian lines in which Saudi Arabia and 
Iran serve as the regional hegemons. However, within the context of the Cold War, while 
Saudi Arabia was predominantly concerned by the threat posed by Iran (as well as Iraq), 
the primary U.S. concern was not that Saudi Arabia maintain a balance of power against 
its neighbors, but rather that it remain a trusted and stable ally in the strategically critical 
Middle East region while continuing to guarantee the flow of oil at a reasonable price. 
Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy-makers were hardly ambivalent of the differences 
between Sunni Arabs and Shi’a Persians and the threat of sectarian violence. Thus, 
despite close relations with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. also established parallel relations with 
Iran in what was known as the policy of the ‘Twin Pillars.’ 
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B. TWIN PILLARS TO IRAQI FREEDOM 
The Twin Pillars policy “relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia to serve as the two key 
protectors of the U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.”100 The U.S. provided military and 
economic support to the competing hegemons with the idea that the balance of power 
would promote stability throughout the region. The expectant calm was intended to create 
an environment that was dependent upon the U.S. and would deny the Soviet Union the 
opportunity to influence the region. Because the U.S. and Saudi Arabia enjoyed a long 
history of diplomatic relations and the majority of the Middle East followed Sunni 
Muslim doctrine, Iran was the variable and required greater attention from the U.S., a 
situation which would eventually add turmoil to the region and will be discussed in a 
subsequent chapter.  
For its part, Saudi Arabia’s regional hegemony is derived from its economic and 
religious prowess; its status as a pillar in U.S. foreign policy provided the security it 
needed to extend its regional dominance. Because the Western economy and international 
trade—from which the U.S. draws its strength—is fueled predominantly by Saudi oil, 
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component of United States’ hegemony. The presence of the majority of the world’s oil 
reserves is critical to its regional economic superiority yet Saudi Arabia derived its 
hegemon status from its religious authority.101  
As such, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the U.S. has cultivated a significant 
undercurrent of dissenters who seek the removal of the Saudi regime. However, despite 
the scrutiny of the world’s Muslim population, the al Saud family has managed to 
maintain its position through the coercion, manipulation, and the co-optation of their 
subjects and is strengthened by the guile and authority of the clergy that espouse a strict 
Wahhabi doctrine. Furthermore, for Westerners, the al Saud family, as patriarchs of the 
Sunni Muslim faith, represents the Sunni population not just in the region but throughout 
the world.  
Unlike Iran, which for many years served as a U.S. proxy in the region, Saudi 
Arabia’s position amongst the Arab community made it a reluctant partner. Particularly 
detrimental to Washington’s influence in Riyadh was, and still is, the U.S. relationship 
with Israel. Iran, however, has a significant Jewish population and, pre-Khomeni Iran 
held no public animosity toward the Zionist state. Nevertheless, the Arab-Israeli divide 
was exacerbated by Saudi Islamists who sought the destruction of Israel and provided 
financial support to anti-Israeli causes. Indeed, Riyadh’s decision to employ the oil 
weapon during the 1973 conflict was an appeal to the Islamists who threatened the 
                                                 
101 Home to Mecca, the Saudis are responsible to over a billion Muslims who expect the kingdom to 
maintain the sanctity and security of Islam’s most holy site. As such, the Saudis have used their oil wealth 
to improve upon the site and make the conditions more bearable to Muslims obligated to perform the hajj. 
In the past, the hajj was the scene of mass deaths due to deplorable conditions along the caravan routes 
which contributed to exhaustion and dehydration, tent fires and stampedes, and acts of terrorism. Today, it 
is estimated that over two million Muslims make the trek annually and, as guests of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, they are treated with air conditioned tents (or nearby hotels for those who can afford it), bottled 
water, medical care, and a robust security plan designed to ensure the safe passage and to prevent would-be 
terrorists the use of the hajj as a political statement.  
The most famous of which occurred in 1979 when anti-Western Islamic Fundamentalist took siege of 
the holy site and held several hundred hostages. Listed among his demands were the expulsion of all 
foreigners from the peninsula and the cutoff of oil exports to the United States. The site was retaken but the 
anti-U.S. sentiment carried over to other Muslim countries where demonstrations were held in Bangladesh, 
India, Kuwait, the UAE, and Pakistan. In more violent protests, mobs also attacked U.S. embassies in 
Pakistan and Libya. Along with the Islamic revolution in Iran, 1979 was a watershed year for the Islamist 
movement and the region.  Decidedly pro-West during much of the Cold War and in the fight against 
Communism, the region suddenly began to display an overt anti-U.S. sentiment that, once the Soviet Union 
crumbled, became the main issue confronting U.S. policy makers. 
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legitimacy of the al-Saud rule. That the embargo came at the expense of the United States 
should have resulted in strict repercussions against the Arab state. However, because of 
America’s dependency on oil, policy makers could not look objectively at the 
relationship and “representatives of the State and Defense Departments regularly testified 
that Riyadh was a strong and reliable partner that could be counted upon to support the 
United States in the region.”102  
The accounting is accurate if one considers that Riyadh continued to provide 
Washington tacit support in matters that did not include Israel but certainly when it 
served the Saudis’ interests. An unstable Middle East was just as much a threat to the al-
Saud regime as it was to Israel and, by extension, the United States. Thus, Saudi Arabia’s 
wealth was quietly used to enact the policies of the United States in the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia’s hegemony was a product of its ability to buy influence and protection 
from its neighbors at the behest of the United States. Unfortunately, Saudi influence 
extended mainly to its Sunni neighbors and was impotent in dealing with Iran and Iraq.  
As stated earlier, Pahlavi-led Iran was a loyal U.S. partner in the fight against 
communism and, until 1979, was considered an “island of stability” in an otherwise 
unstable region.103 Iraq, however, was a constant threat to peace in the region as it 
endured several violent regime changes since it declared its independence in 1932. To 
make matters more difficult, whereas the populations of Iran and Saudi Arabia are largely 
Shi’a and Sunni respectively, Iraq’s population consisted of both Sunni and Shi’a, and 
included a large Kurdish population in the north. It was as though Iraq was preordained to 
serve as the battlefield in which all Muslim sectarian differences would be settled. 
Sectarian disputes prevented Iraq from being a country of any real power despite 
significant oil deposits. Rather, Iraq’s main purpose within the region was to serve as a 
buffer between the regional hegemons, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, in 1980, fueled 
 
 
                                                 
102  Teicher and Teicher, 29. 
103 Quoted in James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 233. 
 48
by a history of border disputes over rights to the waterway that separated the countries 
and amid concerns that Khomeni would attempt to exert influence within its borders, Iraq 
invaded Iran.  
The affects of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War contributed to Washington’s initial 
anxiety over the Iran-Iraq War.104 Washington’s primary concern was how the war would 
affect the oil market; thus, it was imperative that the war remain contained and not affect 
the neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Despite its neutrality during the war, 
Saudi Arabia was understandably concerned with the outcome because, historically, both 
Iraq and Iran posed threats to the Kingdom. Riyadh long suspected Baghdad of 
supporting hostile anti-Saud political movements that threatened Saudi Arabia’s 
influence in the region; and the recent Islamic Revolution in Iran inspired Shi’a riots 
within Saudi Arabia and was a potential threat to the al-Saud’s religious legitimacy. 
After the 1973 crisis, Washington determined that a militarily strong Saudi Arabia 
served U.S. interests in the area. Thus, Washington began a policy of providing Saudi 
Arabia with advanced military technology and training which made the Kingdom the 
second (Israel being the first) most heavily armed state in the region. By 1980, Saudi 
Arabia theoretically possessed the tools needed for a defensive stand against Egypt, Iraq, 
Iran and even Israel, all states it considered a potentially hostile threat. Nevertheless, 
Iraq’s invasion of Iran upset the status quo and gave the kingdom cause for concern 
particularly because of Saddam Hussein’s expansionist behavior. Additionally, the threat 
of Iran emerging victorious against Iraq and continuing its momentum toward the 
Arabian Peninsula was not a risk Washington was willing to accept. Washington 
maintained neutrality early in the conflict but in 1982, a successful Iranian 
counteroffensive forced the U.S. to choose sides. Although Saddam Hussein was a wild 
card and a constant threat to Israel, the events fueled by Islamic fundamentalist fervor 
and anti-U.S. sentiment proved Iran was a greater threat to Saudi Arabia and by extension 
the Unites States. Thus, Washington began its tacit support of Iraq.  
                                                 
104 Certainly Washington speculated how the war would play out politically and its potential affect on 
the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, mainly because the Muslim 
countries exhibited disdain for the godless communists, Washington was only marginally concerned with 
increased Soviet influence in the region as a result of the war. 
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Far from settling the regional disputes, the period marked by the Iran-Iraq War 
witnessed a clear shift in the balance of power in the Middle East which previously 
teetered slightly in favor of the Saudis. Washington’s reaction to the termination of 
diplomatic relations with Tehran was stronger relations with Riyadh which, aside from 
Israel, became the principle recipient of American weaponry. Additionally, because the 
U.S. threw its support behind a Sunni-led Iraq regime, the “Twin Pillars” policy that 
relied on the bipolar existence of Sunni and Shi’a hegemons equally supported by the 
U.S. became a one dimensional policy weighted heavily in favor of the Sunni regimes. 
Despite the lack of support from a superpower, Iran’s influence in the region gained 
strength amongst the other Shi’a regimes and those that benefitted from the anti-Israel, 
anti-Sunni, and anti-U.S. rhetoric espoused by the Islamists. Iran thus prepared itself to 
become the single greatest threat to Saudi Arabia and U.S. influence in the region; in the 
interim, however, Iraq filled that role and further cemented Washington’s position in the 
region.  
1. Operation Desert Storm  
During the eight year Iran-Iraq war which essentially ended in a stalemate, the 
Iraqi military doubled in strength to become among the world’s largest fighting forces. In 
addition to the U.S. aid, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait funded Iraq in the war because they 
had an interest in preventing the rise of Shi’a influence in the region. However, after the 
cessation of hostilities, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were reluctant to forgive that debt 
despite Iraq’s insistence that the war prevented Persian influence in the Arabian 
Peninsula. In attempt to force the issue, Iraq complained to the United States that Kuwait 
was slant drilling into its territory. Iraq argued that the illegal drilling contributed to 
Iraq’s inability to pay its war debts to not only its Arab neighbors but also to Washington 
who, in addition to the aid given to fight the war, gave significant monies to Iraq in order 
to prevent Saddam from turning to the Soviets. Given no other alternative and faced with 
a looming economic crisis, Saddam Hussein ordered his army into Kuwait. Kuwait fell 
quickly and with the bulk of the Iraqi army on its northern border, Riyadh feared that 
Saudi Arabia was Saddam’s next target.  
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Publically, the operation was labeled as a war of Kuwaiti liberation against Iraqi 
aggression, and the world was morally obligated to preserve the sovereignty of a weaker 
nation against an evil foe. However, realists contend that Iraq posed a real and significant 
threat to the world’s largest oil reserves and an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia would 
certainly wreck havoc on the global economy that, on the heels of the Soviet collapse, 
was expanding at breakneck pace. For years the Saudis purchased the best in military 
technology and training from Washington, yet, despite the wealth of small arms, modern 
aircraft and tanks, and advanced air defense systems, Riyadh felt its military was ill-
prepared to challenge the battle hardened Iraqi army. Riyadh appealed to Washington for 
help and, in August 1990, the U.S. mobilized its forces.  
Realism theory supports Saddam Hussein’s offensive behavior in that, in its 
weakened state, Iraq’s only recourse for maintaining its security and sovereignty was to 
demonstrate a threat, real or imagined, against potential adversaries. Unfortunately, and 
as balance of power theory suggests, the unintended consequences of Saddam’s defensive 
acts were an increase in the offensive capabilities of the states that Saddam posed a threat 
against. Israel (which had been the recipient of errant Iraqi Scud missiles during the war), 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia were particularly concerned with Saddam’s intimations and thus 
inclined to increase their defensive posture. Iran, as will be discussed later, made 
investments into nuclear technology and forged relationships with enemies of the U.S.; 
and Saudi Arabia, once again, leaned heavily on Washington even at the risk of creating 
dissent amongst the Arab-Muslim world.  
2. Common Enemies 
The U.S.-Saudi relationship, forged out of Realpolitik and the bulwark of U.S. 
policy in the Arab world, has evolved into a dangerous arrangement that threatens both 
states’ internal security as the continued ignorance of ideological considerations opened 
the door to an enemy dedicated to their destruction. Hardliners such as Osama bin Laden 
who seek the destruction of the U.S. for its support of Israel also hold the Saudi rulers in 
contempt and consider the regime the “near enemy” in its jihad against the pro-Western 
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regime. The violent nature of these extremists has resulted in internal threats against the 
Saudi regime, audacious assaults against the U.S. military, and of course the tragedy that 
occurred on September 11, 2001.  
Despite no indication that the Saudi regime itself is responsible for the support of 
terrorism, critics argue that Saudi Arabia’s foreign and domestic policies created an 
environment that fostered violence from Islamic fundamentalist groups and targeted the 
United States as well as the Saudi regime as the subject of their condemnation. 
Publically, the Saudi regime made overt demonstrations that would seem to be an effort 
to distance itself from the United States in order to recapture credibility amongst the Arab 
world, particularly those that criticize the regime. At the Arab League summit meeting of 
March 2007, King Abdullah denounced the American involvement in Iraq by calling it 
“illegal.”105  
At a time when the United States faced global criticism for the perceived failures 
in Iraq, this was an unexpected and unprovoked attack from its most important and most 
trusted ally in the region. Four months later, Washington announced that it had prepared a 
package in which $20billion in advanced weaponry would be delivered to Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbors. This in itself is not extraordinary; as a key ally during the Cold War, 
the United States has a long history of providing Saudi Arabia with weapons. However, 
the timing of this announcement, so soon after his earlier condemnation of the United 
States, rendered King Abdullah’s comments transparent as simply an attempt to gain 
favor from the regional leaders, and pacify not just the ulama, the foundation of the 
regime’s religious legitimacy, but also the fundamentalists who held the Saudi regime in 
contempt for its relationship with Washington. 
Nevertheless, as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah must 
preserve Saudi Arabia’s position as the hegemon in the Arab world. In doing so, he 
recognizes that the source of his power is, in large part, based on the relationship with the 
United States and not from the people of Saudi Arabia who, by and large, reject the royal 
family. As such, the Saudi regime is compelled not to distance itself too far from the 
                                                 
105  Fattah, Saudi King Condemns U.S. Occupation of Iraq. 
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United States, but rather use the relationship and the strength of the its military to 
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position relative to any threats, real or perceived, as well as 
internal or external. Because, even as the Saudi government is the continued target of 
violence that could be a precursor to revolution, Iran still looms large as the most 
imminent threat to the sovereignty of the Sunni state. The arms deal then was a “plan to 
bolster the militaries of the Persian Gulf countries…to contain the growing power of Iran 
in the region and to demonstrate that, no matter what happens in Iraq, Washington 
remains committed to its longtime Arab allies.”106  
For its part, Riyadh distinguished itself from its Persian regional rival by giving 
the appearance that Saudi Arabia is a country on the throes of modernity and prepared to 
conform to the rules and norms of globalization. Saudi Arabia recently ascended into the 
World Trade Organization and, unlike Tehran, which continues to provide support to 
Hamas and Hezbollah, Riyadh has denounced the use of violence by Islamic 
fundamentalist groups.107 Additionally, although Saudi clerics espouse an Islamic 
fundamentalist religion, all evidence indicates that the regime is far removed from the 
extremist nature of those state and sub-state actors that support the use of terrorism and 
are enemies of the U.S. Nevertheless, the perverse nature of the relationship has opened 
Washington and Riyadh to harsh, and seemingly just, criticism overshadowed only by 
other events that mar the region. When the U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam, the 
failure to provide immediate stability set the stage for a resurgent Iran to capitalize on the 
imbroglio, exert influence in the failed state, and achieve a greater slice of the Middle 
East at the expense of Saudi hegemony. 
C. SUMMARY 
Saudi Arabia’s rise to such a formidable position within the Middle East and the 
world is very much a product of its alliance with the United States and its adherence to 
                                                 
106  Cloud, U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia. 
107 The World Trade Organization is an international organization chartered to liberalize trade 
between states. Its website states that it is a “negotiating forum” with “a set of rules” that “helps to settle 
disputes…;” not exactly the tenets of Islamic Fundamentalist organizations.  For more see “What is the 
World Trade Organization?” 
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the tenets of defensive realism. That is not to say that without the United States, Saudi 
Arabia would still be a barren wasteland of nomads; certainly its oil wealth attracted a 
number of suitors willing to serve as a sponsor to the Arab nation. However, the relative 
strength of the United States and its distant location appealed to the Saudis who were 
acting defensively to protect their wealth against foreign threats. Additionally, early on 
the Saudis existed in a position of inferiority and were dependent upon the U.S. alliance 
for economic aid as well as security. However, as demonstrated by the oil crisis of 1973, 
Saudi Arabia possesses its own source of strength. Riyadh has employed Walt’s idea of 
the “monopoly supply of an important asset” to develop itself into a regional hegemon to 
which Washington is committed.108 The imbroglio in Iraq, however, is the tipping point, 
and as Iran marches closer toward its nuclear ambition, the nature of the U.S.-Saudi 
alliance will be tested far beyond what it has yet endured. 
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IV. IRAN 
Iran and the United States have been engaged in a proxy war for nearly thirty 
years and the current crisis in Iraq coupled with Tehran’s quest to achieve nuclear power 
have only amplified the tension between the once and would-be allies. During the Cold 
War, Iran was a valuable and close political U.S. ally, however, beginning with the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979, Tehran adopted an Islamic fundamentalist philosophy and 
“set a policy direction intended to challenge U.S. influence…in the region.”109 
Subsequent to the revolution and the hostage crisis, Washington severed all diplomatic 
relations. Tensions reached a boiling point when President Bush rebuked Iran for its 
support of international terrorism and included Iran in the infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ 
speech. Indeed, the U.S. State Department considers Iran “the most active state sponsor 
of terrorism” and is primary financier to Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as other 
organizations whose goals are the destruction of Israel and the elimination of U.S. 
hegemony.110 Ironically, despite the regime’s Islamic fundamentalist intimations, the 
population of Iran is rather pro-Western in its ideology; Iran is one of the few states in the 
region to have a democratically elected government. In fact, of all the states in the region, 
Iran’s secular, liberal population shares more in common with the United States than any 
other state in the region including those the U.S. considers its allies. However, 
Washington’s continued support of Riyadh affects the regional balance of power and 
comes at the expense of Tehran. Thus, current tensions between the U.S.-Saudi alliance 
and Iran have reached an impasse and promise to get worse as long as the two sides 
refuse to engage in diplomatic discussions. This chapter will review the policies and 
events that shaped Iran’s recent history as it involved the United States in order to 
develop a clearer understanding of the current imbroglio and its likely outcome as it 
relates to the regional balance of power.  
                                                 
109  Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, December 28, 2007). 
110  United States, State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” (Washington D.C.: Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 28 April 2006) <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm> 
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A. THE U.S.-IRAN ALLIANCE IS BORN 
In sharp contrast to the United States and Saudi Arabia, two countries whose 
relevance is in its relative infancy, Iran’s historical lineage, beginning with the Persian 
Empire through the Safavid Dynasty, is rich and prodigious. Indeed, Persia was a global 
imperial power until the nineteenth century when it succumbed to the European powers 
that colonized and exploited the region.111 Washington’s interest in Iran began as a 
commercial endeavor in the mid nineteenth century but quickly evolved as Iran sought a 
return to power. Devastated by the political and economic ruin caused by Russian and 
European subjugation, Iran called on the United States to reorganize the government’s 
finances and help the failing empire embrace the norms of modernity.112 Iran trusted the 
United States because Washington as yet maintained a political isolationist policy toward 
Europe and Asia, and distance provided protection from American colonial or imperial 
inclinations. The United States was immersed in a period of rampant growth and a 
population explosion that required an influx of resources. Thus, Washington’s interest in 
Iran was, like all other foreign powers, centered on oil.  
In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States and Iran were headed in 
opposite directions on the empirical ladder. The technological development and 
modernity that propelled the West into global dominance evaded the Middle East and by 
the turn of the century, the Persian Empire reached the nadir of its decline. While the 
United States’ hegemony was on the rise, Iran had not yet captured the value of its oil 
reserves which would be critical to Persia’s rise to prominence in the second half of the 
century. Nevertheless, up until 1952, relations between the United States and Iran were 
positive and seemingly on equitable terms. Tehran solicited and received valuable 
economic and developmental assistance from Washington which, in return, received oil 
concessions and secured a regional strategic partner. As the need for oil became critical 
                                                 
111  Iran and Persia will be used interchangeably throughout the essay. Officially, “Iran” is used in the 
political context while “Persia” is used in a historical or cultural context. 
112 Tehran looked to the United States because it was “unblemished by the foreign manipulations of 
the last one hundred years and…could be trusted to be sympathetic to the Iranian cause as a consequence of 
her own historical experiences.” Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy 
and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 19-20. 
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to the United States’ relevance as a global power, any perceived threat or Soviet 
expansion in the Middle East was a matter of national security. Thus, newly-elected 
President Eisenhower considered intervention in an unstable Iran a compulsory 
component of his Cold War doctrine.  
B. FROM THE COUP TO THE TWIN PILLARS 
In 1951, newly appointed Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, nationalized the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in order to rid the nation of all forms of foreign involvement. 
Long time sponsor, Great Britain responded by enacting economic sanctions against Iran 
and the loss of patronage plunged Iran into an economic crisis. The British believed that 
blame for the crisis would fall on Mossadeq and the Shah would be forced to remove him 
from power. To the contrary, Mossadeq never fell out of favor with the Iranian people 
and his stance against the British earned the Prime Minister hero status among Persians as 
well as Americans who were delighted with the historic similarity to the U.S. and the 
revolutionary connotation of challenging British rule. His popularity achieved cult status 
when he was named Time magazine’s Man of the Year. Subsequently, President Truman 
voiced his support of the nationalization of the AIOC and invited Mossadeq to the White 
House. Despite protests from London, Truman was most concerned by instability in the 
oil markets and had no intention of undermining Mossadeq and challenging Iran’s 
sovereignty. However, Mossadeq’s policies and increased popularity was a threat to the 
Shah, contributed to instability within Iran, and later forced Washington to intervene.113  
                                                 
113 Nationalization of the oil company was the first step in Mossadeq’s policies that sought to restrict 
the power of the monarchy and put more into the hands of the people. In a move that appeared to assuage 
the concerns of the London, Washington, and the Shah, Mossadeq resigned reportedly in a dispute over the 
allocation of constitutional powers. The Shah chose Ahmad Qavam to replace the popular Mossadeq. 
Perhaps not the best choice, Qavam was responsible for granting concessions to the Soviets that led to 
Soviet occupation of Iranian territory. His previous policies ran directly counter to the nationalist Mossadeq 
and, immediately upon taking office, Qavam—somewhat predictably—announced that relations with the 
British would be resumed sparking widespread protests across the country. The Shah was forced to dismiss 
Qavam and re-appoint Mossadeq as Prime Minister.  
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1. Operation Ajax 
Although Washington maintained that it would not undermine Mossadeq’s 
government, overtly or covertly, a program was initiated during the Truman 
administration and continued under Eisenhower ostensibly designed to “weaken the 
Soviet position in Iran.”114 Over time, however, the program became more aggressive 
and, despite public admission to the contrary, was used to weaken Mossadeq’s National 
Front party by targeting figures loyal to Mossadeq. Whether it was a result of the CIA’s 
activities or the British, who were actively engaged in similar efforts, several leaders of 
the National Front soon turned against Mossadeq. Convinced of British perfidy, 
Mossadeq severed ties thus ending the era of British domination in Iran. Reeling from the 
loss of control of the Iranian oil industry, London convinced Washington that 
Mossadeq’s policies were driving Iran toward communism. This information triggered an 
interventionist response from President Eisenhower who agreed to participate in 
overthrowing the government of Iran.115   
The coup was a watershed event and, for most Americans and Iranians, marked 
the beginning of U.S.-Iranian relations. It is the first time the United States, under the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, proactively pursued actions intended to thwart perceived 
communist intrusion in the Middle East and underscored the United States’ recognition 
                                                 
114 The CIA-led program began as a “propaganda and political action program run through a network 
headed by two Iranians” and targeted the Soviet Union and the pro-communist Tudeh party.”  Mark J. 
Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3 
(1987), 268. For more detail on the CIA’s program in Iran, see Ray S. Cline, The CIA Under Reagan, Bush 
& Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 
1981), 119-126. 
115 By alienating the British, the longtime U.S. ally, Mossadeq forced Washington’s hand and soon 
after, senior CIA and MI6 officials collaborated on a plan to overthrow the popular nationalist leader. 
However, the success of the coup was dependant on the Shah’s ability to elicit the help of military forces 
and rally support against the popular Mossadeq. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi represented the dichotomy of 
Persian attitudes toward the West. On one hand, Persians were disappointed with their government for 
kowtowing to Western norms and sought a return to prominence free of foreign intervention. On the other 
hand, they recognized that without the West—particularly, the United States—Iran would not be able to 
rise above its socio-economic condition. Thus, Pahlavi just like his father, Reza Khan, had a history of 
working with the United States and continued his father’s quest for modernization with assistance from 
Washington. When it was determined that Mossadeq was a threat to U.S.-Iranian relations, Pahlavi 
believed he had no choice but to support the coup and oust the popular nationalist prime minister. For a 
more thorough account of the coup, see Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the 
Roots of Middle East Terror, 2008 ed. (Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2008).  
 59
that the region was critical to its national interests. Although Saudi Arabia had already 
become a reliable regional partner, the Saudis, their Wahhabi traditions, and the regime’s 
resistance to modernity, (duplicitous as it is) were an enigma to most Americans. In 
contrast, Americans could empathize with Iranians and their attempts to break free from 
imperialist chains. Furthermore, Iran’s population was far more tolerant of other religions 
and, in its quest for modernity, recognized the benefits of a secular, liberal government. 
The perceived similarities between Iran and the United States made Iran Washington’s 
prize in the Middle East and the bulwark of U.S. Middle East foreign policy.  
2. Twin Pillars 
In addition to access to Iranian oil, Washington depended on Tehran as the critical 
component of its ‘Twin Pillars’ policy in which regional balance of power was upheld by 
Iran and Saudi Arabia.116 Although Saudi Arabia was a loyal ally, Washington believed 
that Iran was vastly closer in ideology and would prove to be a stronger ally over time. In 
Reza Pahlavi, Washington had a gracious ally who affirmed his gratitude to the United 
States for ousting Mossadeq by acting as a U.S. surrogate in the region. Iran made use of 
its oil revenue and upgraded its military with American made weapons. The increased 
wealth also gave the Shah the resources needed to expand his nascent nuclear program, 
every aspect of which was supported by Washington.117 As a result, Iran grew in power; 
but with increased power came increased responsibility. Iran’s assimilation to Western 
norms meant that it was expected to be held accountable and perform functions on behalf 
of the West. Because of its strategic position, Iran served as the guardian of the Persian 
Gulf and stood as the first line of defense against possible Soviet incursion into the 
Middle East.  
With the support and encouragement of the United States, Iran’s resurgence as a 
military power enabled the Shah to adopt a series of economic reforms intended to 
                                                 
116 Teicher and Teicher, 29. 
117 The U.S. helped launch the nuclear program of Iran in the 1950s and continued to provide support 
until the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the Shah.  For more, see Gawdat Bahgat, "Nuclear 
Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran," International Studies Perspectives 7 (2006), 124-136. 
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develop the country into an industrial power and gain favor from the West.118 Indeed, 
Iran and the Shah drew the attention of western companies which invested heavily in the 
Iranian economy. Unfortunately, however, the economic reforms occurred too quickly, 
well ahead of social and democratic reforms that would have allowed the majority of 
Iranians to benefit from the westernization of Iran. Rampant illiteracy and a fundamental 
lack of comprehension of even basic legal frameworks plagued the would-be benefactors 
of the reforms. Corruption was pervasive and, as a result, the reforms failed to bring the 
Shah the political capital he had lost by alienating the clergy and the elites.119 The effect 
of the failed reforms is summarized by Ali Ansari in his book, Confronting Iran. 
Both groups [clergy and elites] had been essential in facilitating the coup 
against Mossadeq in 1953 and were vital to the domestic sustenance of the 
institution of the monarchy. In attacking them, the Shah was alienating the 
pillars of his regime with a view to replacing them with a grateful 
enfranchised peasantry. He grew more dependent on the United States, 
while America, increasingly divorced from alternatives in Iran, grew more 
dependent on him.120 
In the short term, the Shah nevertheless increased his grip on power, fleeting as it 
was, by consolidating his authority over all aspects of the government. In private, 
President Carter admonished the Shah’s leadership, but the absence of a viable alternative 
committed Washington to the relationship. Additionally, because the United States was 
responsible for empowering the Shah in 1953, a reversal of course would have severely 
damaged the superpower’s regional hegemony and encouraged the Soviet Union to 
extend its influence into Iran. Thus, despite widespread protests and growing dissent 
among the Iranian clergy, in 1977, President Carter reaffirmed the relationship and 
                                                 
118 The White Revolution was a series of nineteen reforms introduced over a period of fifteen years 
and were intended to bring Iran into modernity in the Western model. Among the reforms were voting 
rights for women, the abolishment of feudalism, the establishment of education and health care programs, 
etc. The reforms were promoted by Washington which believed that their economic benefits, certain to be a 
windfall, were secondary to the democratization of Iran that was sure to result. See Ansari 45-49. 
119 The reforms put the Shah at odds with the Shi’a clergy and landed elites whose position, power, 
and wealth were threatened. Land was stripped from the elites and placed into the hands of the 
disenfranchised and those who otherwise would have never been able to acquire property. The Shah 
believed that the loss of support from wealthy landowners, the traditional power brokers in Iran which 
included the clergy, would be balanced by the vast support he would receive from those that were indebted 
to the Shah for their newfound fortune. See Ansari 54-66. 
120 Ansari, 48. 
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credited the Shah with turning Iran into an “island of stability” in the region and said that 
it was certainly attributed to the “respect, admiration, and love” Iranians felt for their 
leader.121 The widespread adoration claimed by President Carter was a fabrication 
intended to espouse support for a failed leader. 
3. Blowback 
In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright publicly acknowledged and 
expressed regret for Washington’s involvement in the 1953 coup. Certainly forty-seven 
years of hindsight proved that the United States suffered considerable ‘blowback’ for the 
operation.122 It was the first operation of its kind for the CIA and its approval was 
perhaps hastily provided by a new president eager to stem communist aggression before 
it began and it was believed that Mossadeq’s leftist sympathies rendered him a liability 
whereas the Shah maintained a strict anti-communist position. Iran’s valuable oil reserves 
also drove Eisenhower to make the decision he felt best served national interests as well 
as the post-war global economy that could only be saved by affordable fuel from a stable 
Middle East.  
Critics argue that if not for the coup which ousted Mossadeq, “Iran would 
probably have continued along its path toward full democracy,” and that by supporting 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the United States brought “progress toward democracy [in 
Iran] to a screeching halt.”123 The critique seems to justify or ignore Mossadeq’s attempts 
to consolidate power and implies that they were less egregious in 1951 than the Shah’s 
efforts to do the same in the 1970s. The critique also ignores the Shah’s social reforms 
and posits that they were simply weak attempts to placate Iran’s Western patrons. The 
reform’s mismanagement should not, however, obfuscate their well-aimed intent to bring 
Iran into the industrialized world and raise the socio-economic condition of the Iranian 
population. Regardless of what revisionist history has determined the outcome of the 
                                                 
121 Quoted in James Bill, 233. 
122 The term “blowback” was first used in a 1954 CIA document entitled, "Clandestine Service 
History – Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran – November 1952-August 1953." Since then, the term 
has come to mean the unintended consequences of covert operations.  
123  Kinzer, ix.  
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coup to be, that current tensions between Washington and Tehran have their roots in this 
event is an absolute. Nevertheless, many Americans compartmentalize the event as a 
necessity of the Cold War and view the history of U.S.-Iranian relations primarily 
through the biased prism of the 1979 Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis. 
C. THE REVOLUTION 
Beginning with the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the world witnessed the rise of events 
from radicals encouraged by Islamic fundamentalists who, in addition to the destruction 
of Israel, sought to subvert or extricate foreign involvement in traditional Islamic lands, 
be they Arab, Persian, or Ottoman.124 In Iran, fundamentalists blamed the country’s 
social and economic woes on years of subjugation at the hands of the United States and 
considered the Shah a servant of Western materialism and godlessness. Indeed, the 
financial boon that occurred in Iran after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War promised nationwide 
economic prosperity but failed because of rampant corruption and mismanagement of 
which the Shah was the primary participant. By 1978, demonstrations were a common 
occurrence in Iran’s political landscape and the Shah’s inability to manage domestic 
issues coupled with an increasingly fervent and growing Islamism resulted in his removal 
from power and the ejection of U.S. influence in Iran.  
Fomented by the Shah’s religious opposition, the demonstrations were comprised 
of middle class students, who, in a reversal of course, protested the Shah’s veiled 
liberalization policies and Westernization through self-imposed restrictions on dress and 
stricter adherence to Islamic law. Their participation did not necessarily indicate a desire 
to return to strict fundamentalist Islamic teachings but rather demonstrated their rejection 
of the Shah’s failed social reforms and his kowtowing toward Western materialism and 
greed. The Shah attempted to quell the nascent uprising by offering concessions but his 
                                                 
124 The formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 is popularly regarded as the birth of the Islamic 
Movement as it is understood today but the 1967 Arab-Israeli War provided global awareness.  
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efforts were unsuccessful and weakened his waning hold on power.125 A few months 
later, the Shah left Iran and never returned. The absence of Washington’s loyal surrogate 
opened the door for the religious clergy to exert their influence and, in February 1979, the 
revolution was declared victorious. Shortly thereafter, the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
established, and its leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, turned his attention toward the ‘Great 
Satan.’126  
Khomeini blamed most of Iran’s ills on what he perceived as exploitation by the 
United States at the expense of the Iranian people. He stated that, “Our relations with the 
United States are the relations of the oppressed and the oppressor…the plundered and the 
plunderer.”127 Thus, in October, when President Carter allowed the Shah to enter the 
United States to receive medical treatment, Khomeini considered it yet another 
transgression against Iran. Fueled by anti-U.S. rhetoric and enmity for the Shah, hundreds 
of students scaled the wall, seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, and ignited.  
1. The Hostage Crisis 
In November 1979, students, led by a dozen or so Islamic extremists, seized the 
embassy and held fifty-two hostages for 444 days.128 Masked by a pre-planned 
demonstration to honor protestors killed a year previously by the Shah’s police, the 
students scaled the walls and turned what was supposed to be peaceful protest into the 
crisis that embarrassed the United States and emboldened Islamists the world over. 
Washington was no better prepared for this crisis than it was aware that Iran was 
preparing for revolution the previous year. President Carter first attempted diplomatic 
                                                 
125  A historical review of conditions in Iran clearly shows that a revolution was forming. However, in 
August 1978, a CIA National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran “is not in a revolutionary or even a 
prerevolutionary situation,” which demonstrates Washington’s misunderstanding of the situation and a 
fundamental lack of comprehension of the motivations behind the Islamic movement. Jimmy Carter, 
Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto; New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 438. 
126 Ansari, pg 87. In Confronting Iran, Ali Ansari describes the origins of the term ‘Great Satan.’ “..in 
Islamic thought, Satan is temptation personified, and the U.S. personified the temptations of material 
culture, the excesses of which were among the great faults of Reza Pahlavi.”  
127 Quoted in Oren, 545, from Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United 
States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 515.  
128 The plan to seize the embassy was not conceived by Khomeini but by students of his teachings 
who sought the Ayatollah’s approval. Ansari, 88.  
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means to resolve the crisis but resorted to more powerful forms of pressure through 
economic sanctions and boycotts of Iranian oil. However, after all diplomatic ties were 
severed in April 1980, the ill-fated military attempt to rescue the hostages proved to be 
the final embarrassment for the U.S. President. Khomeini’s movement successfully 
“undermined the political, economic, and strategic hegemony of America in the 
region.”129 To Islamists, Washington’s inability to resolve the matter served as evidence 
of Allah’s will and added to their perception of American weakness.  
If the point of conception for the anti-U.S. Islamist movement is the U.S.-led coup 
in 1953 than the crisis of 1979 was its maturation point and cemented the enmity that 
currently exists between Tehran and Washington.130 The revolution also clearly 
delineated the balance of power in the Middle East. The pre-revolutionary period was 
defined by U.S. hegemony in which the Twin Pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia, buttressed 
the U.S. policy of Soviet containment in the Middle East. After the revolution, Iran 
became the primary sponsor of those state and non-state actors who also follow a strict 
Islamist policy and consider their goals the return of the caliphate, the destruction of 
Israel, and the elimination of U.S. regional hegemony. However, it would be years before 
Iran would be relevant in global politics. The absence of Washington as its protector left 
Iran vulnerable to invasion by the Soviets—a strong possibility had the Soviets not 
invaded Afghanistan the previous year—or the Iraqis, which attempted to capitalize on 
Iran’s weakness and establish itself as the dominant regional power.  
D. WAR, SCANDAL, AND TERROR 
Washington responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by drawing a clear 
line in the sand and declaring that it will “use any means, including military forces” to 
                                                 
129  In his book on the revolution and subsequent hostage crisis, Mark Bowden, calls the revolution, 
“the first battle in America’s war against militant Islam, a conflict that would eventually engage much of 
the world.” See Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War with Militant 
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repel “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.”131 In 
what became known as the Carter Doctrine, the U.S. made it clear that, despite the recent 
revolution in Iran, it considered the Persian Gulf region within its realm of influence and 
would stop at nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from undermining U.S. authority. In a 
demonstration of U.S. bravado, even after the adverse economic effects of the 1973 oil 
crisis instigated by the Saudis and the humiliation of the 1979 hostage crisis owing to 
Khomeini, Washington still treated the Middle East states as marionettes. Accordingly, 
when Iraq invaded Iran, Washington, which was not predisposed to support Iran or Iraq, 
pulled the strings it deemed necessary to produce the results favorable to U.S. interests 
but with little regard for their repercussions. This arrogance resulted in a contradictory 
foreign policy that armed U.S. enemies, further enraged the already violently hostile 
fundamentalists, and contributed to the region’s instability.  
1. The Iran-Iraq War 
In the 1970s, Soviet-backed Iraq was a growing but manageable menace in the 
region but still posed little threat to U.S.-backed Saudi Arabia or Iran. However, after the 
revolution, Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was emboldened to capitalize on Iran’s 
vulnerability and invaded Iran in order to seize regional power forfeited by its Persian 
neighbors. Initially, Washington abstained from providing support because neither side 
was much of a friend to the U.S. However, the U.S. was concerned that an Islamic 
fundamentalist victory against Iraq would spill into Saudi Arabia and would further 
disturb the oil supply. In 1983, Washington restored diplomatic relations with Iraq and 
sent Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to meet with Saddam Hussein and provide 
whatever was necessary to avoid losing the war with Iran.  
In addition to selling weapons to Iraq, the U.S. increased its naval patrols of the 
Persian Gulf, ostensibly to protect the shipping routes on which the bulk of the world’s 
                                                 
131 The exact text reads,  “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” For more, 
see the full speech, Jimmy Carter, 1980 State of the Union Address (Washington D.C.: January 23, 1980) 
<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml> (March 6, 2008). 
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oil supply traveled. However, the presence of the U.S. Navy imbued Saddam with 
confidence as he initiated the bitter ‘Tanker War’ in which oil tankers and merchant ships 
from both Iran and Iraq, as well as those from neutral countries, were attacked. 
Subsequently, both the U.S. and Soviet Union deemed it necessary to involve themselves 
in order to protect the supply of oil. The Soviet Union chartered tankers and the United 
States reflagged ships knowing that an attack on a U.S. flagged ship amounted to an 
attack on the U.S. itself and the U.S., under international law, was allowed to respond 
militarily. The apparent cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet Union demonstrated 
their recognition that a stable Middle East superseded their animosities toward one 
another. The apparent détente may have been a contradiction in foreign policy but it 
reflected Washington’s realist tendencies later demonstrated by the Iran-Contra Affair. 
Throughout the conflict, the Soviet Union provided arms to both Iran and Iraq in an effort 
to hedge its bets on the outcome, a practice the U.S. would employ with disastrous 
results. 
2. Iran-Contra 
As mentioned before, the U.S. originally maintained a policy of neutrality 
between Iran and Iraq; Secretary of State Kissinger even intimated that it was unfortunate 
that they could not both lose.132 Thus, it should be no surprise that a few months after 
announcing its support for Iraq, agents of the United States initiated a covert program 
which sold weapons to Iran, a sworn enemy of the state, and illegally used the money to 
fund a group of rebels, the contras, in South America.133 President Reagan publically 
proclaimed that the intentions were noble and that it was necessary to renew relations 
with Iran because “without Iran's cooperation, [the U.S.] cannot bring an end to the 
Persian Gulf War; without Iran's concurrence, there can be no enduring peace in the 
                                                 
132  Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to 
Confrontation, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), 18. 
133 When word of the program broke, President Reagan defended the initiative stating that it was 
“undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an 
honorable end to the bloody 6-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and 
subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages [in Lebanon].”For more, see Address to the Nation 
on  the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, 1986, 
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/111386c.htm> (March 6, 2008). 
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Middle East.”134 However, the affair stood as a reminder of Washington’s realist 
tendencies and its desire to affect the outcome of the war in order to generate a favorable 
outcome for the U.S., despite potentially adverse repercussions. In this case, those in 
Washington believed that the U.S. would achieve greater benefit from a prolonged 
conflict in which both Iran and Iraq depleted their military capability. Consequently, the 
U.S. provided weapons to a Soviet backed nationalist Arab in Saddam as well as the 
radical Islamist Khomeini.  
3. Rise to Terror 
For its part, Iran was eager to accept weapons from the United States because the 
conflict with Iraq severely depleted its military capacity to wage war. Iran had also 
become a pariah among the Gulf countries which considered it the greatest threat to 
stability in the region and were therefore balancing against it. Nevertheless, 
Washington’s willingness to engage in matters of such political and military importance 
with Tehran—even covertly—so soon after the revolution “reinforced the belief among 
Iranians that the United States was duplicitous and hypocritical.”135 Particularly damning 
was Washington’s tacit support of the corrupt Saudi regime as well as the Mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan in their fight against the Soviets even while it condemned Islamist groups in 
the Levant. Despite President Reagan’s efforts to renew the relationship between the US 
and Iran, Washington’s vacillating foreign policy embittered radical fundamentalists and 
pushed Iran to create a surrogate aimed at subverting U.S. hegemony in the region. 
At the time when Washington was providing arms to Iraq, Iran was funding 
Lebanon-based Hezbollah, an off-shoot of Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamic state, to 
engage in a proxy war targeting U.S. interests in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s primary 
foe was the secular government in Lebanon which it hoped to transform into an Islamic 
republic in the Iranian model. However, Hezbollah also sought the elimination of Israel  
 
                                                 
134  Address to the Nation on  the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy, 1986, 
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/111386c.htm> (March 6, 2008). 
135 Ansari, 105. 
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and the termination of U.S. influence. The next several years witnessed multiple murders, 
bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings perpetrated against Americans by Iranian-
supported Hezbollah.136 
Khomeini miscalculated Washington’s response to the terrorist attacks by 
assuming the rising death toll would force the U.S. to ‘cut and run’ just as it had done in 
1979. Although the U.S. did withdrawal from Lebanon within a year of the 1983 barracks 
bombing, Washington continued to wield its power in the Persian Gulf throughout the 
Iran-Iraq War and the Vincennes incident, while reportedly an accident, demonstrated 
Washington’s resolve.137 Because the Iran-Iraq War had such a damaging effect on Iran’s 
military and its economy, Khomeini could ill afford to antagonize the U.S. Iraq too, had 
suffered greatly through the conflict and thus the Iran-Iraq War ended in a stalemate. Just 
as Kissinger had hoped, both countries lost. The two countries suffered an estimated 
million deaths and their militaries were rendered barely capable to serve as anything 
more than a defensive force. Additionally, the war left both countries with tremendous 
debt and faltering economies, which in turn, led Iraq to invade Kuwait a few years later 
and compelled Iran to withdrawal from global politics until such time as it could reinsert 
itself and attempt to regain lost power.  
E. ISLAMISTS AND IRAQ 
In the wake of Khomeini’s death in 1989, newly elected President, Akbar 
Rafsanjani, turned the national attention toward domestic issues in order to recover from 
the war. Although the war caused significant damage to Iran’s economy, it fostered the 
nationalist spirit that would be required if Iran was to rebuild itself without the support of 
                                                 
136 Until Al Qaeda far surpassed them on September 11, 2001, Hezbollah was responsible for more 
U.S. deaths than any other terrorist organization. Hezbollah was responsible for a series of violent and 
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a sponsor as it had with the United States. Economically, Rafsanjani benefitted from 
Iran’s vast oil reserves; but he also advocated a free market and enacted liberalizing 
measures intended to recreate Iran as an industrial power.  
Politically, Iran abstained from committing itself in any direction and condemned 
both the United States and Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Additionally, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union meant that it was no longer a threat for the U.S. to balance against. 
Thus, because the fear of Soviet intervention on behalf of Iran no longer existed, 
Washington would be less inhibited to engage if Iran threatened the sovereignty of its 
neighbors. Regardless, Iran continued to sponsor terrorist organizations in a not-so-covert 
effort to undermine the influence exerted by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. 
However, the realism that defined Cold War era Washington was swept away by the 
economic idealism of the 1990s and the hesitant foreign policies of the Clinton 
administration.  
1. Axis of Evil 
Critics argue that it was not fear of ‘blowback’ but rather fear of a backlash from 
the American public that prevented President Clinton from committing resources to 
thwart the rising trend of terrorism committed by Iranian surrogates against American 
targets or those of U.S. allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Rather, he preferred diplomacy 
even when it continuously failed to produce results. His attempts to strike an accord 
between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were exercises in 
futility and contributed to the contempt for the U.S. held by Islamists. Their 
determination to strike at symbols of U.S. power was evident in 1993, when Islamists 
made an attempt to knock down the World Trade Center and, again in 2000, when a 
suicide bomber attempted to sink the USS Cole as it was docked in Yemen. Although 
both events were funded or organized by Al Qaeda, who as of yet had no obvious ties to 
Iran, their success convinced extremists everywhere that the U.S. was unwilling to 
employ military forces. Indeed, the U.S. treated both events more like criminal acts than 
acts of war. Unfortunately, these events were only small indications of the grand scale 
violence the extremists were capable of committing.  
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The non-response by the U.S. was perceived by extremists as weakness and 
arguably served as encouragement for the fateful attacks of September 11, 2001. 
However, the brutality of the act and the election of President George W. Bush ensured 
the U.S. would take a decisive and drastic retaliatory response. Shortly after the attacks, 
President Bush announced a new course for U.S. foreign policy in which America would 
“make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid 
to them.”138 As such, the President included Iran as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ for its 
support of terrorism and declared it a “grave and growing danger” to American 
sovereignty.139 Tensions between Tehran and Washington were never higher, at least 
until the U.S. placed Iran in the precarious position of being sandwiched between the 
bulk of America’s military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, Iran was 
compelled to take a defensive posture and surreptitiously target the U.S. military effort in 
Iraq.  
2. Opportunity Knocks in Iraq 
Iran contributed to the insurgency and targeted the nascent Iraqi government in 
order to weaken U.S. influence and foster a favorable outcome for Tehran. Furthermore, 
Tehran believes a stable and prospering Iraq—buttressed by the U.S. and, by extension, 
Saudi Arabia—will weaken Iran and place the balance of power strongly in favor of the 
Saudis. Consequently, fundamentalist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad supports efforts 
to undermine the U.S. stability process in Iraq, funds anti-U.S. terrorist organizations 
throughout the region, and refuses to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program.140 Iran’s 
failure to comply with U.N. resolutions and international regulations which govern the 
                                                 
138  George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 
17, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (March 9, 2008), 5.  
139  Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 
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development of nuclear energy has forced the U.N. to impose increasingly restrictive 
sanctions on Iran. However, resolutions and sanctions have, to date, proven fruitless.  
Because it regards itself a global, vice regional power, Iran considers its goal to 
obtain nuclear power an expected path to ascendancy as well as a matter of self-
defense.141 The United States, however, considers a nuclear armed Iran a destabilizing 
threat and has intimated that, if necessary, it will use force to prevent Iran from achieving 
its goals. To that end, in an effort to “contain the growing power of Iran,” Washington 
recently approved a multi-billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors loyal 
to the U.S.142 Saudi Arabia is also committed to the prevention of Iranian influence in the 
Middle East. However, Riyadh’s motivations are largely economic and religious, of 
which, the latter has reinvigorated the Sunni-Shia divide that has historically defined the 
animosity between the two nations. 
As of late, President Ahmadinejad has directly inserted himself into the fold and, 
in a recent visit to Iraq—the first such visit by an Iranian President since before the Iran-
Iraq War—Ahmadinejad pledged $1 billion in hopes of securing an economic partnership 
with its neighbor at the expense of U.S. and Saudi influence.143 During the 
announcement, Ahmadinejad criticized the U.S. and condemned the occupation, all made 
worse by the presence and apparent approval of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. 
Ahmadinejad’s agenda is obviously intended to engender anti-U.S. sentiment and elicit 
loyalty from the predominantly Shi’a nation in order to expand the influence of the 
Iranian-led ‘Shi’a Crescent.’ Whereas Iraq once stood as a Sunni bastion and the first line 
of defense against Persian incursion into Arab lands, current efforts to shift Iraq’s 
allegiance would markedly shift power away from the Saudis. Iran’s ties to terrorist 
organizations and nuclear ambitions only intensify its posture as a real and imminent  
 
 
                                                 
141 Iran is centrally located amongst several nuclear states (Israel, Russia, Pakistan, India, China) who, 
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142 Cloud.  
143  Richard A. Oppel, "Ahmadinejad Hails 'New Chapter' in Iran-Iraq Ties," International Herald 
Tribune, March 2, 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/02/africa/iraq.php> (March 9, 2008). 
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threat to stability in the Middle East and throughout the world. Thus, the imbroglio in 
Iraq is of significant importance and although it stands to determine the regional balance 
of power, the implications are global.  
F. SUMMARY 
Iran’s rich and storied history as a military and religious power reached its nadir 
during the twentieth century but is currently experiencing a renaissance centered in its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons and embrace of Islamic Fundamentalism. Arguably, the 
twenty-first century iteration of Iranian power has its roots in Washington’s participation 
in the 1953 coup that ousted the popular nationalist leader in favor of a megalomaniac 
whose pro-West stance was supportive of U.S. foreign policy at the expense of Iran’s 
social and economic development. Washington’s lack of consideration for the coup’s 
potential blowback resulted in a continued misunderstanding of the situation and pushed 
Tehran further toward an Islamist philosophy which targeted the U.S. as the reason for 
Iran’s social and economic ills. Thus, when the Islamic Revolution cast the United States 
out in 1979, Iran recreated itself as the principal sponsor of Islamic fundamentalists 
whose stated goals are the destruction of Israel and the deterioration, if not elimination, of 
U.S. global hegemony. To that end, Iran re-established itself as the balance to Saudi 
regional hegemony and continues to seek means to advance its position relative to its 
Sunni neighbor. Consequently, the current war in Iraq has provided a vehicle by which 
Iran can intervene and impose its influence, making the outcome a tipping point which 
will determine the fate of the Middle East as the two powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, vie 
for regional supremacy. Because the bulk of the world’s oil reserves exist in the region, 
the potential for blowback is a certainty which demands that Washington craft a coherent 
policy vis-à-vis Iran and Saudi Arabia and considers the likely occurrence of a new arms 
race. 
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V. IRAQ - THE TIPPING POINT 
The Iraq War has had many unintended consequences and chief among them is 
Iran’s resurgence as a regional and potentially global power. Author of All the Shah’s 
Men, Stephen Kinzer, argues that even as Washington rails against rising Iranian 
influence in the Middle East, the United States “did Iran the huge favor of destroying the 
two regimes it feared most: the Taliban…which was run by fanatically anti-Iranian Sunni 
extremists, and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq....”144 Long relegated to defensive 
posturing, the absence of its primary threats allowed Iran to go on the offensive and to 
indulge in “opportunistic expansionism” in an attempt to expand its influence into 
Iraq.145 Rising Iranian influence forced Riyadh, which maintained a defensive realist 
foreign policy, to counter Tehran’s efforts in the region. The result is a proxy battle 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia as the two powers compete over territory, economic 
dominance, and religious authority. Whereas Iraq used to serve as a buffer between the 
would-be regional competitors, the U.S. invasion and subsequent power plays by Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have ignited an arms race that promises to result in the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East.  
A. THE ROAD TO SECTARIAN CIVIL WAR 
During the Iraq-Iran War, Riyadh supported Iraq because it was concerned that a 
Shi’a victory would encourage the Shi’a in Saudi Arabia to revolt as well. With a 
significant population of Shi’a in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has long 
endured minor skirmishes with dissidents before and quelled them through a policy of 
appeasement, coercion, and oppression. Nevertheless, the Sunni al-Saud have always 
feared a Shi’a uprising which nearly became a reality after the Iranian revolution and 
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again during the 1991 uprising in southern Iraq.146 Years later, when U.S. forces entered 
Baghdad and it became clear that the Americans were ill-prepared to manage the 
occupation phase of the war, Islamic fundamentalists—under the banner of Shi’a from 
Iran and Sunni from Saudi Arabia—seized the opportunity to conduct a proxy war in Iraq 
not only against the U.S. but also against each other. Thus, the fall of Iraq became the 
tipping point that would alter Iran-Saudi Arabia relations and lead to a belligerent 
escalation of animosities.147 
Academics, journalists, and policy makers abound have surmised that sectarian 
strife was determined to ignite a civil war in Iraq which would spill over and thrust the 
entire region into chaos as the Shi’a and Sunni finally settle their dispute in armed 
fashion. There certainly is reason to believe this would be the case; when Baghdad fell 
and Saddam fled, security also collapsed and Iraqis returned to their tribal alliances.148 
Sunnis and Shi’a groups, sponsored by—if not the governments themselves—agents 
from Saudi Arabia and Iran who intervened and looked to capitalize on the absence of 
order by reclaiming ancestral tribal and religious territory. If not for the presence of 
nearly 200,000 coalition troops, it is likely that Iraq would have indeed fallen into civil 
war; rather, the commitment to a unified Iraq was tenuously maintained. As it appears 
less likely that Iraq will fall into sectarian conflict, the tenuous coexistence of Saudi 
Arabia and Iran assumes a less hostile possibility. However, what divides the two states is 
also what possesses them to act in ways that increase the threat they represent to each 
other. Whether it is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the formation of a Shi’a 
                                                 
146 Indeed, soon after the Iranian revolution, there were uprisings in Kuwait and in Saudi Arabia; 
Shiite demonstrations were met with brutal force as the Saudi National Guard leveled Shiite shrines. After 
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crescent comprised of terrorist sympathizers or an Arab alliance, signified by the recent 
robust US arms purchases by Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors, the advancement in 
the relative power of one is closely monitored and results in action by the other.  
B. RECENT POWER PLAYS: IRAN 
Initially, Iran supported Iraq’s compliance with the U.S.-led election process that 
promised to deliver democracy and the establishment of a national government which, 
because of their demographic advantage, would presumably be dominated by the Shiites. 
Indeed, in the elections of 2005, the Shi’a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won a majority of 
seats in the fledgling national government and Prime Minister Maliki is also the leader of 
the Shi’a Islamic Dawa party. A report by the International Crisis Group notes that the 
Iranian influence in Iraq is primarily prevalent in the south where there is a greater Shi’a 
population and politicians whose parties are heavily influenced by Iranian money.149 
However, nationalism is strong throughout Iraq and, despite the Shi’a dominance in the 
fledgling Iraqi government, Iran has thus far been prevented from exerting significant 
control within the political realm. Unfortunately, this has compelled Tehran to seek other 
means of gaining influence.  
Soon after the fall of Saddam, forces from within Iran actively supported 
insurgents and militias that sought to frustrate U.S. and coalition forces out of Iraq, thus 
giving Iran the opportunity to expand its influence. Commanders frequently found caches 
of Iranian-made weapons and evidence that Qods forces were training militia 
organizations in Iraq, a point that compelled President Bush to designate as terrorists the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and issue sanctions against the elite military 
organization.150 In April 2008, General Petraeus testified that Iran is using Hezbollah to 
train and arm militias in order to form a “Hezbollah-like force to serve [Iran’s] interest 
and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces.”151 Despite the Iranian 
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government’s promise that such activities stopped months ago, substantial evidence 
exists that indicate Iran is still providing weapons to anti-coalition forces in Iraq.152  The 
most powerful and most dangerous of these organizations is the Mahdi Militia. 
According to a March 2007 report to Congress, the Mahdi Militia led by Shi’a 
cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has supplanted al-Qaeda as the greatest threat to stability in 
Iraq.153 As the name suggests, the Mahdi Militia draws inspiration from the same 
messianic impulses that drive Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Indeed, it is widely known 
that al-Sadr receives spiritual guidance from Iranian clerics and that Tehran has 
benefitted from al-Sadr’s attempts to disrupt stabilization efforts in Iraq.154 Although al-
Sadr has proved a divisive figure in Iraqi politics, he has also contributed to stability in 
Iraq by imposing a ceasefire on his militia that is widely credited with minimizing 
sectarian strife and instilling hope that Iraq may emerge from its current state of chaos. 
However, his motivations are unclear; as long as U.S. forces are bogged down in Iraq, 
focus is away from Tehran’s global ambitions and Washington’s options for the denial of 
nuclear weapons are limited to strategic airstrikes. Contrarily, a stable Iraq would enable 
Washington to pursue broader military options in an attempt to minimize Iran as a threat. 
Thus, by imposing the ceasefire it is believed that al-Sadr has lost political favor in Iraq 
which not only explains why he has been hiding in Iran but also indicates that 
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nationalism has superseded sectarianism in Iraq. Nevertheless, the imbroglio in Iraq has 
focused Washington’s attention on Iranian activities within the region while Tehran, 
persistent in its quest for global recognition, has worked to expand its influence outside 
the greater Middle East. 
Despite significant economic restrictions imposed by the United Nations and 
supported by the U.S., President Ahmadinejad has reached out to countries in Latin 
America, particularly Venezuela and Cuba, as well as rising economic powers, Russia 
and China, in order to seek economic and strategic partnerships. The partnership between 
Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba has obvious roots in an anti-American sentiment but is 
extending to other countries that would benefit from the oil wealth of Iran and Venezuela 
“on condition that they alter their stances toward the United States.”155 While this 
alliance threatens U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere, Iran’s nascent alliance with 
Russia and China has greater strategic implications. According to a 2006 Congressional 
Research Service report, Russia’s weapons sales to Iran have ballooned since 2000.156 
Furthermore, cash-strapped Russia has expanded its relationship with Iran to include 
nuclear fuel. China too, purchases weapons from Russia but its ties to Iran result from its 
desperate need for energy to fuel its burgeoning economy. As such, China is among 
Iran’s largest importers of oil and natural gas thus providing Tehran the financial means it 
deems necessary to expand its nuclear weapons program.157 Because Russia and China 
are prominent members of the UN who have opposed punishing Iran for its refusal to 
adhere to UN resolutions, Iran is emboldened by the forged alliances and continues its 
quest for power and hegemony. 
C.  RECENT POWER PLAYS: SAUDI ARABIA 
While Tehran continues its assault on the status quo and applies the tenets of 
offensive realism, Riyadh’s response has been traditional and predictable. As detailed in 
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Chapter III, Saudi Arabia has long relied on the U.S. in a policy of buck-passing in order 
to provide for its defense.158 In a continuation of that policy, the 2007 arms deal will 
provide advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors sending a clear message to 
Iran that the U.S. is committed to its allies. However, Middle East scholars, Gregory 
Gause and Toby Jones note that Riyadh has a “sense of urgency” to balance against Iran 
because Iraq has “already tipped the scales in favor of Iran.”159  Indeed, Riyadh is well 
aware that if the U.S. were to withdrawal from Iran, the kingdom would be forced to 
support Sunni guerillas in order to thwart Shi’a influence in Iraq. Thus, while it still 
prefers to have the U.S. accept the burden of dealing with Iran’s aggressive behavior, the 
“sense of urgency” compels Riyadh to take a more active role in the efforts to stifle Iran’s 
growing influence in the region.  
According to Gause, Saudi Arabia is conducting a “nuanced balance of power 
game” by inserting itself into crises throughout the region in an attempt to limit Iran’s 
influence.160 Hence, Saudi Arabia has been increasingly involved in discussions 
regarding the crises in Israel and Lebanon, which, because of its sponsorship of Hamas 
and Hezbollah, long have been dominated by Iran. In 2002, Abdullah announced a peace 
plan in which Israel, in exchange for full recognition from the Arab states, would 
withdrawal to the 1967 borders.161 Riyadh has also been vocal in its frustration with the 
presidential crisis in Lebanon. Although Damascus is the primary target, Riyadh also 
                                                 
158 Mearsheimer defines buck-passing as the practice in which a state tries “to get another great power 
to check the aggressor while they remain on the sidelines.” He continues to say that “threatened states 
usually prefer buck-passing to balancing, mainly because the buck-passer avoids the cost of fighting the 
aggressor in the event of war.” See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 139.  
159 See Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia and Iranian Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 
10, 2007 <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2007/ioi/070320-gause-cfr.html> (May 10, 2008); and 
Toby Jones, “Driven by a Sense of Urgency,” April 27, 2007 <http://www.saudi-us-
relations.org/articles/2007/ioi/070427-jones-urgency.html> (May 3, 3008). 
160 Gause.  
161 For more details on the initiative, see Prados and Blanchard, 12. The initiative, endorsed by 
Washington, cost King Abdullah political capital because it runs counter to strict fundamentalist doctrine 
that calls for the destruction of Israel. Thus, although Saudi Arabia contributes $100 million per year to the 
Palestinians, the Wahabbis believe the peace plan is another example of the al-Saud regime’s proclivity for 
kowtowing to the U.S. In a 2007 speech to the Arab League, King Abdullah condemned the U.S. action in 
Iraq as an “illegal foreign occupation.” However, rather than drawing U.S. ire, the statement was 
recognized for what it was, a veiled attempt by Abdullah to distance Riyadh from Washington; a point that 
was made evident just a few months later when Saudi Arabia and the U.S. agreed to the arms sale that 
would keep the country beholden to the U.S. for a long time forward. See Fattah’s article “Saudi King 
Condemns U.S. Occupation of Iraq.” 
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includes Tehran and its client, Hezbollah, in its lament. Riyadh believes that if it can cast 
a large enough shadow on the Syria-Iran alliance while providing financial support to the 
Lebanese government, Saudi Arabia will emerge as the primary regional power 
broker.162 Riyadh’s increased involvement in these crises is significant and signals a 
more proactive posture in its regional diplomatic foreign policy, necessary if Riyadh 
hopes to curb Tehran’s influence. Thus far however, the crisis in Iraq, has been 
dominated by Iran and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic efforts to deter Iranian influence have 
fallen short. 
Despite the power plays, recent developments give the appearance that détente is 
possible if not likely. In March 2007, a few months after he became the first sitting 
President of the Islamic Republic to perform the hajj, King Abdullah also invited 
President Ahmadinejad to Riyadh, his first official visit to the kingdom, and the two held 
discussions in which they agreed, in principle, to “stop any attempt aimed at spreading 
sectarian strife in the region.”163 That the two leaders engaged in diplomatic discussions 
is encouraging but occurs even as both sides are aggressively vying against each other in 
order to capture power at the other’s expense.164 The promise these talks held was 
quickly abated as a result of continued sectarian violence in Iraq. In July, Iranian-Saudi 
relations were further hampered when Saudi muftis issued an anti-Shi’a fatwa and the 
Saudi government cracked down on Shiites within the kingdom.165 Undoubtedly, Riyadh 
                                                 
162 Robert F. Worth, “Despite Infighting, Meeting of Arab Leaders Gets Under Way in Damascus,” 
The New York Times, March 30, 2008 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/world/middleeast/30arab.html> (May 10, 2008). 
163 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal as quoted in Souhil Karam, “Ahmadinejad, Saudi 
King Reject Sectarian Strife” Reuters, March 3, 2007 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0332990520070303?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandCha
nnel=0> (May 10, 2008); and Hassan Fattah, “Iranian President Meets Saudi to Discuss Mideast Issues,” 
International Herald Tribune, March 3, 2007 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/04/africa/web.0304saudi.php> (February 9, 2008). 
164It is well documented that Tehran is suspected of expanding its influence in Iraq by arming and 
training Shi’a militias. Contrarily, that Sunni Saudi clerics have surreptitiously funded Sunni insurgents is 
widely believed but largely ignored, at least in the sense that Washington has not substantiated the evidence 
or accused Riyadh of direct involvement. Nevertheless, despite public criticism, Riyadh’s official position 
has been to remain politically uninvolved if only to allow the U.S. to continue its efforts unfettered by the 
baggage of appearing to cater to Saudi Arabia at the expense of the Iraqi people.   
165 “Religious Leaders Voice Outrage at Anti-Shia Fatwa of Saudi Muftis,” Islamic Republic News 
Agency, July 23, 2007, <www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0707236565184405.htm> (May 3, 2007). 
In an article for the website bitterlemons.org, Toby Jones noted that the kingdom began “suppressing Shiite 
cultural activities, harassing community leaders, interrupting the observation of religious rituals, and even 
arresting activists.” Toby Jones, “Driven by a Sense of Urgency.” 
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is threatened by rising Iranian influence in Iraq which afforded Ahmadinejad the 
opportunity to grandstand in a visit to the Iraqi capital in March of this year. Not 
surprisingly, the visit did little to stem sectarian fueled animosity between Sunni and Shia 
leaders in Iraq; while Iraqi Shi’a, including Prime Minister Maliki, lauded Ahmadinejad, 
Sunni leaders condemned the visit and supported the U.S. premise that Iran is fueling the 
violence in Iraq in order to expand its influence in the troubled state.166 King Abdullah, 
on the other hand, has yet to visit Iraq and appears content to pass the buck of dealing 
with Iran in Iraq to the U.S.  
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Because Riyadh is unwilling or incapable of presenting a viable counter to Iran’s 
regional influence, Washington is compelled to act if it is determined to prevent Tehran 
from developing a nuclear weapon and becoming a regional, if not global, power. It is 
unclear if Iran’s nuclear program, which is still subject to close scrutiny from the IAEA, 
appears to be as advertised; a peaceful venture designed to provide an alternate source of 
energy for a burgeoning middle class that allows Iran to sell its largest resource.167 
However, Tehran is not known for its transparency and the cloud of mystery that 
surrounds Iran’s nuclear program, coupled with President Ahmadinejad’s continued 
threats toward Israel, render trust a dangerous attribute for makers of U.S foreign policy. 
Thus, Washington is forced to make critical decisions based on assumptions that will 
undoubtedly have global implications and dangerous repercussions without the benefit of 
                                                 
166 In stark contrast to the secretive visit to Baghdad by President Bush just three weeks earlier 
President Ahmadinejad was openly received by Prime Minister Maliki who credited Ahmadinejad with 
helping to curtail violence in Iraq. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad attempted to explain the resentment Iraqis feel 
toward Americans when he stated that “Iraqi people don’t like Americans.” See Sam Dagher, 
“Ahmadinejad's Iraq Visit Bolsters Iran's Influence,” csmonitor.com, March 3, 2008 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0303/p01s04-wome.html?page=1> (May 24, 2008). 
167 At the time of writing, the IAEA reported that Iran continues to defy UN demands that it suspend 
its nuclear enrichment activities. President Ahmadinejad has stated that Iran will not comply because he 
asserts that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and the UN has no authority to determine Iran’s right to 
develop nuclear energy. Although the report did not disclose any findings that Iran is operating a non-
peaceful nuclear program, it did indicate that Iran continues to avoid revealing all the information asked of 
it. See Scott Peterson, “Nuclear Report: Parsing Iran's Intent,” csmonitor.com, June 5, 2008 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0605/p06s02-wome.html> (June 5, 2008); and Mohamed ElBaradei, 
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, (Vienna, Austria: International 
Atomic Energy Agency, May 26, 2008). 
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all the facts that could make the decisions virtually mathematic. It is a game of chicken 
that currently rests on the shoulders of two leaders who have been similarly criticized for 
abiding to their religious impulses. 
1. Status Quo - Apocalypse Now 
Because the consequences of being wrong have catastrophic results, the Bush 
Administration has chosen to err on the side of caution. That is to say, if the words of 
President Ahmadinejad are to be taken literally, than the administration is currently 
acting on assumptions that empower policy makers to develop courses of action aimed at 
preventing Iran from achieving its stated goals. The assumptions are: 
• The development of nuclear power is designed to disguise Tehran’s 
primary agenda of developing nuclear weapons in order to reestablish 
itself as a regional and global power.168  
• That once it achieves nuclear power, Tehran will be emboldened to pursue 
a more hostile stance toward Israel that could include the nuclear 
destruction of the Jewish state and could also target the U.S. and other 
allies.169 
• Tehran’s motivation for its belligerent rhetoric is founded in its messianic 
beliefs that the world must exist in a state of chaos in preparation for the 
return of the 12th Imam.170 
If one is to accept these assumptions, the implications are frightening and explain 
President Bush’s concern that a nuclear armed Iran could spark a world war.171 It is no 
wonder then that the current administration continues to emphasize that, as long as Bush 
remains in office, a nuclear armed Iran will not be tolerated. Critics of this logic argue 
                                                 
168 The UN Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions on Iran for its failure to end its 
pursuit of uranium enrichment. The council provided incentives that would provide Iran the enriched 
uranium it would need for a safe nuclear energy program. However, the enrichment process which Iran 
seeks and the council hopes to deny is the technology that allows the development of weapons grade 
uranium. 
169 As recently as May, as Israel and the world celebrated the 60th anniversary of the formation of the 
Jewish state, President Ahmadinejad called Israel a “stinking corpse,” an implication that its end was near.  
170 See Chapter II, Rational Actors. Contrary to this assumption is a Washington Post report out of 
Tehran that leading Iranian clerics have criticized President Ahmadinejad for his continued assertion that 
modern day Iran is led by the Imam. See Thomas Erdbrink, “Ahmadinejad Criticized for Saying Long-Ago 
Imam Mahdi Leads Iran,” The Washington Post, May 8, 2008 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/05/07/AR2008050703587.html?hpid=topnews> (May 27, 2008). 
171 George Bush, “Press Conference by the President,” TheWhiteHouse.gov, October 17, 2007 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071017.html> (May 27, 2008). 
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that President Bush is too driven by religious impulses and cannot discriminate between 
obligation to his beliefs and a responsibility to seek a more pragmatic foreign policy.  
With the bulk of the U.S. military, particularly the ground forces, committed to 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, any threats of military action appear disingenuous 
or lacking teeth. Thus, if Bush is to be believed, the military option is limited to strategic 
strikes from the air and sea aimed at decapitation of the leadership in Tehran as well as 
the destruction of any and all sites suspected of contributing to Iran’s nuclear energy 
program. Although these strikes may indeed prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, the U.S. will again be perceived as an imperialist crusader nation bent on the 
destruction of Muslim regimes. Therefore, it is critical that the U.S. not act without the 
endorsement of the international community. Additionally, the crisis in Iraq serves as a 
lesson as to what happens when severe measures are taken based on inferior intelligence. 
Unfortunately, Iran’s unwillingness to comply with UN resolutions forces the U.S. and 
the international community to act without the benefit of all the facts but certainly before 
it is too late. 
Since November 2007, when the National Intelligence Council published its 
findings that indicated that Iran halted its nuclear program in 2003, there have been 
several reports, as well as statements out of Iran, that clearly show significant progress 
toward the attainment of nuclear weapons. In addition to the suspected relationship 
between Iran, Syria, and North Korea based in the exchange of nuclear technology, 
President Ahmadinejad has traveled to nuclear powers India, Russia, and China, in order 
to forge alliances currently based in energy but would ostensibly support a nuclear armed 
Iran.172 In April, President Ahmadinejad publicly lauded his country’s efforts when he 
announced that Iran had installed 6000 new centrifuges; this despite the insistence from 
the IAEA that Iran suspend the program until thorough inspections are completed and it 
is determined that its program is truly designed for peaceful purposes.173  
                                                 
172 Indeed, fuel-strapped India has been one of the more vocal supporters of Iran’s quest for nuclear 
power.  Russia too, has contributed to Iran’s nuclear program and provided technology and intellectual 
capital for its reactor in Bushehr. Like India, China is in desperate need of alternative energy sources and is 
willing to make concessions with Iran in exchange for oil and natural gas.  
173 The IAEA claims that Tehran was exaggerating its claims but did acknowledge the existence of 
enough centrifuges that, given time, could produce enough enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons. 
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It is fear of the unknown but with an eye toward the worst that compels President 
Bush to prepare for war with Iran even as his credibility and political capital have 
reached historic lows. His resolve is so strong that he is willing to risk the immediate 
future of his party as well as what is left of U.S. global hegemony. If President Bush’s 
faith and his pledge to protect the citizens of this country are to be believed, than it must 
be assumed that he has considered the potential cost in human capital and that the lives of 
more U.S. troops are an acceptable risk and a preferred alternative to the possibility of 
hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths as a result of a nuclear attack on Israel or the 
U.S. However, the same resolve that compels Bush to prepare for war has had the 
secondary effect of launching the region into an arms race in which the Sunni U.S. allies 
have begun to seek nuclear weapons to defend against a potentially nuclear Iran.  
Indeed, the administration agreed last year to provide arms to its Sunni allies in an 
effort to thwart Iran’s regional influence. However, critics were concerned that the 
weapons deal would only antagonize Tehran and further embolden them to stay the 
course. After all, as balance of power theory supports, Iran could now assert that it is 
merely behaving in a defensive manner because it is the threatened country surrounded 
by heavily armed Sunnis sponsored by a nuclear armed U.S. that has already shown a 
proclivity to invade a sovereign nation. Rather than reducing the threat from Iran, critics 
argue that the U.S. only cemented Tehran’s resolve. Continued application of balance of 
power theory accepts that, since Iran began its relentless quest for nuclear energy, all six 
members of the GCC have announced their intentions of acquiring nuclear power.174 
These states certainly believe that Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are offensive in nature and, 
because of his aggressive rhetoric, the GCC states are compelled to take a defensive 
stance and balance against the threat posed by Iran. In perhaps the most significant 
development to occur that clearly shows the dangerous implications of balance of power 
                                                 
174 Also mentioned in Chapter II, see Glover. Also, in January, France signed a nuclear cooperation 
deal to build nuclear power stations in the United Arab Emirates. 
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theory, in May 2008, President Bush reportedly signed an agreement with King Abdullah 
to provide enriched uranium to Saudi Arabia.175  
Although Saudi Arabia has been a longtime U.S. ally, its record of governance 
exists in complete contrast to American ideals and its contribution to regional instability 
is cause for grave concern. More presciently, as the primary religious, economic, and 
military adversary to Iran, the U.S. has knowingly and willingly agreed to provide the 
very materials that Iran has shown a ruthlessness to acquire and use at its earliest 
opportunity. Understanding that it is the enrichment technology itself that proves most 
dangerous, the transfer of nuclear materials nevertheless sends a clear message to Iran; 
that the U.S. is prepared to provide Saudi Arabia the materials necessary to balance 
against Iran. The U.S. is clearly following balance of power doctrine, however, this Cold 
War methodology has not proven to be an effective deterrent but has instead only excited 
an unstable adversary. Thus, the U.S. must consider alternative solutions rather than 
continue to fuel a dangerous arms race.  
2.  A New Course - Diplomacy 
The status quo method of deterrence that President Bush is currently following 
has yet to show any signs of success; rather, Iran continues to defy international rule and 
the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in weapons and nuclear technology to some of 
the most oppressive governments in the world. That is why critics of the Bush doctrine 
support diplomatic engagement as an alternative solution. Unfortunately, just as there is 
no indication that Iran is responsive to threats, there is also no indication that Iran would 
respond to diplomacy. Nevertheless, some politicians, political scientists, analysts, 
journalists, historians, and the like believe that negotiations could achieve the national 
objectives that evade our current policies. The matter of whether or not the U.S. should 
                                                 
175 The program is advertised as a peaceful program that will provide the kingdom with a civil energy 
program as an alternate to oil at a time when the price of oil nears $130 per barrel. It is also intended to 
prevent Saudi Arabia from developing its own nuclear program which risks the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. However, regardless of whether or not it is an ally, that President Bush is apparently willing to 
exchange nuclear technology for oil concessions with an authoritarian regime that possesses a deplorable 
human rights record runs contrary to the administration’s agenda of working with and developing liberal 
democracies. See Scott Stearns, “Bush in Saudi Arabia for Nuclear Deal,” VOAnews.com, May 16, 2008. 
<http://voanews.com/english/2008-05-16-voa23.cfm> (June 4, 2008). 
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diplomatically engage Iran has even become the most divisive matter between 
presumptive presidential nominees Barack Obama and John McCain.  
Of course, belief that Iran would be responsive to diplomacy requires acceptance 
of another core set of assumptions. They are: 
• President Ahmadinejad is not the primary power broker and Iran is guided 
by secular, vice spiritual, impulses.176 
• The achievement of nuclear power is truly designed for peaceful purposes 
that will allow Iran to use its natural resources to finance development in 
an otherwise stagnant economy.177 
• Once nuclear power is acquired, Iran will act in accordance with 
international regulations. 
• In addition to its use as an alternative energy source, Iran seeks nuclear 
power to balance against the perceived threat of increased U.S. influence 
in the region as well as a hostile Israel. 
As a sovereign nation, Iran certainly has the right to defend itself against threats 
posed by neighboring nations. To that end, nuclear weapons serve as the ultimate 
deterrent. There are even some who believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
would actually contribute to regional stability.178 Indeed, as the dominant Shi’a regime in 
the region, Iran is surrounded by traditional enemies that are supported by the U.S. This 
was made all the more disconcerting for Tehran after 9/11 and President Bush included 
                                                 
176 Because the Republic of Iran is founded under Islamic principles, it is difficult to assume that there 
may ever be a separation of church and state. However, this is the fundamental assumption that must be 
believed for hope to exist that diplomacy can work.  
177 Although Iran continues to assert that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, the 
IAEA reported in May that Iran will not comply with inspections that would dispel rumors to the contrary. 
The report contends that Iran is in fact engaging in delaying tactics and is otherwise not acting in good 
faith. See, “Iran's Failed 'Litmus Test',” The Washington Post, editorial May 28, 2008 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702752.html> (May 28, 
2008). Additionally, Iran’s continued defiance of international law has resulted in several economically 
damaging sanctions. Should Tehran comply and it is determined that its program is safe, it is easy to 
imagine that the sanctions would be lifted and Iran would enjoy a boon of economic activity.  
178 As discussed in Chapter II, Kenneth Waltz has argued that the ‘spread’ of nuclear weapons would 
serve as a greater deterrent to war and therefore would promote stability amongst traditionally hostile 
adversaries. Waltz, however, does little to address the possibility of religiously motivated non-state actors 
acquiring and detonating a nuclear weapon to advance their beliefs. He argues that states in possession of 
nuclear weapons will be more inclined to adopt international rules and will have the security necessary to 
protect against this event. See Sagan, 1-45. Thomas P.M. Barnett also argued that a nuclear armed Iran, 
under the guidance of the international community, would serve as the Muslim counter-balance to nuclear-
armed Israel and would contribute to regional stability. Barnett contends that Iran should be accepted as a 
rational actor rather than a state that is currently backed into a corner with the full threat of the international 
community which has in turn spurred its quest for a counter balance. See Barnett.  
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Iran in the ‘Axis of Evil’ which, after the invasion of Iraq, appeared to designate Iran as 
the next target of U.S. aggression. It is perhaps understandable then that Iran should want 
to acquire nuclear weapons in order to bolster its defensive posture which, according to 
Waltz, would deter potentially hostile states from attacking. However, uncertainty and 
Iran’s unwillingness to be forthright gives reason to believe that Iran has nothing other 
than offensive intentions with its nuclear program. Thus, if IAEA inspectors are accurate 
in their assessment that Tehran is engaging in stall tactics while continuing to enrich 
uranium, it may be best to negotiate now before Iran acquires greater leverage or before it 
is too late. 
Certainly the cost of not negotiating is severe, especially if one considers the 
potential cost to human life.  However, unlike with the status quo policy and the 
assumptions listed earlier in which there are actions and comments that demonstrate their 
sincerity, there is nothing to indicate that Tehran would be responsive to diplomacy. 
Negotiations have chiefly been rejected because Washington demands that Tehran 
accepts preconditions prior to discussions.179  Furthermore, although clerics have 
admonished Ahmadinejad for his comments regarding the 12th Imam, no one else in 
Iran’s leadership is providing an alternate or secular viewpoint.180  Additionally, Tehran 
continues to defy UN resolutions and deny inspectors the access necessary to exonerate 
Iran from incriminating speculation that it is indeed developing a nuclear weapons 




                                                 
179 Among the preconditions is compliance with UN resolutions that demand Tehran suspends its 
uranium enrichment program. To illustrate how divisive the matter has become, in May, Barack Obama 
indicated that, if he were elected president, he would be willing to talk with Iran without preconditions. 
Amir Taheri, “Obama to A'Jad: Atomic Assist,” nypost.com, May 21, 2008, 
<http://www.nypost.com/seven/05212008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/obama_to_ajad__atomic_assist_111
819.htm?page=0> (May 28, 2008) 
180 There have been repeated reports that clerics inside Iran have criticized Ahmadinejad for his 
remarks about the Mahdi and have asked him to tone down the anti-Israel rhetoric. However, 
Ahmadinejad’s continued actions to the contrary indicate that the demands are insincere or meant to placate 
Iran’s adversaries.  
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President Ahmadinejad.181 It is becoming apparent that Tehran’s lack of transparency 
and failure to comply with international law — coupled with President Ahmadinejad’s 
antagonistic rhetoric — presuppose hostile intentions that demand immediate and stern 
action from Washington in order to achieve national objectives with respect to Iran’s 
nuclear program.  
In 2006, the U.S. State Department proposed direct negotiations between 
representatives from the U.S. and Iran. As a precondition to those meetings, the U.S. 
demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment program. Not surprisingly, Iran refused and 
continues to assert that it will negotiate only if no preconditions are established. To be 
fair, it seems disingenuous that, prior to ever meeting, the U.S. would demand Iran do the 
very thing that the negotiations were intended to discuss. It would also be duplicitous of 
the U.S., given its own history of support of insurgent activity in the name of national 
interests, to demand that Iran cease funding to the insurgency in Iraq as well as its 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah. 
Since 2006, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have offered 
Iran new incentives that would seem to satisfy Iran’s quest for nuclear energy as well as 
expand trade. Tehran rejected the incentives which compelled the UN to approve a third 
round of sanctions. Tehran’s continued rejection of international rules and norms is 
indicative of a state that is attempting to hide its true intentions; a conclusion that is 
supported by the recent IAEA report that accuses Iran of not being completely forthright.    
Thus, it is easy to conclude that Iran would not respond to negotiations—with or without 
preconditions—that would satisfy the UN’s demand that Tehran suspend its uranium 
enrichment program.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Offensive or Defensive? 
The U.S. and Iran are currently at a dangerous impasse and the strategy currently 
employed by the Bush Administration rests on the notion that the tenets of realism apply 
                                                 
181 See Peterson and ElBaradei. 
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to the system. The evidence suggests that Iran’s incendiary rhetoric and shadowy nuclear 
program are consistent with offensive realism in which Tehran seeks absolute power at 
the expense of others. It is undeniable that Tehran seeks to achieve great power status; 
whereas Iran was traditionally limited to serving as sponsor to non-state actors acting on 
its behalf, the imbroglio in Iraq created an opportunity for Iran to reinsert itself into great 
power politics. In addition to its nuclear ambitions, Tehran has engaged in a proxy war in 
Iraq with the U.S. and Great Britain that, on occasion, escalated into direct 
engagement.182 This behavior is implicit of a state bent on aggressive and offensive 
posturing and the severity is only heightened by the tenacity of the aggressor and the 
strength of its target. As Mearsheimer posits, “to qualify as a great power, a state must 
have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all out conventional war 
against the most powerful state in the world.”183  
Certainly it can be argued that Tehran is simply testing the U.S. resolve 
particularly at a time when the full measure of U.S. military power cannot be employed 
due to its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, Iran is taking advantage of a 
perceived vulnerability to demonstrate the relative strength of its military. However, 
Tehran is well aware that it could not withstand the full onslaught of an unencumbered 
U.S. military; which is why Iran is fervently engaged in developing its nuclear weapons 
program. According to Mearsheimer, “In the nuclear age great powers must have a 
nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable 
forces.”184 Should the U.S. reach a time when it is no longer required to commit so much 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran must present a significant deterrent or it will no longer have 
the leverage it currently uses as a stall tactic in order to prevent direct confrontation. Only 
then could Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons be mistaken as a defensive measure. 
                                                 
182 As mentioned earlier, Iran is alleged to have provided weapons and training to the insurgency in 
Iraq. Tensions escalated in March 2007, when 15 Royal Marines and sailors were captured by Iranian 
forces in disputed territorial waters between Iran and Iraq. The latest example occurred in January 2008, 
when U.S. warships bound for the Persian Gulf encountered Iranian speedboats engaged in provocative 
actions while traversing through the Straits of Hormuz.  
183 Mearsheimer, 5. 
184 Ibid. 
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2. Buck-passing or Balancing? 
In an attempt to distract critics, President Ahmadinejad has argued that Iran is 
actually the threatened country. During an interview in 2006, Ahmadinejad stated that he 
“fully opposed the behavior of the behavior of the British and the Americans” because of 
their support of Israel which “threatens the future of all peoples….”185 By casting the 
West and Israel as the aggressors, Ahmadinejad has attempted to defend Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions as a necessary deterrent to hostile intentions which, after the invasion of Iraq, 
would seem to have credence. However, Tehran’s constant refusal to disclose 
information on its nuclear program demonstrates the type of behavior consistent with 
power seekers and not states that are, as Waltz posits, merely aiming to survive. If that 
were the case, that Iran is simply seeking security, than it could engage in buck-passing 
by aligning itself with other great powers. Russia and China are both formidable powers 
that have shown a willingness to engage Iran despite international opinion.186 Indeed, the 
continued dialogue amongst the three states is cause for concern but true buck-passing by 
Iran would preclude the need for nuclear weapons. Rather, it is apparent that Tehran is 
attempting to balance against perceived threats.  
However, balance of power theory can only truly be applied when all participants 
are rational actors and behave in a predictable manner. As shown in this paper, 
throughout the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia and Iran employed a policy of buck-
passing to defend against external threats which fell directly upon the U.S. to serve as the 
balance to regional threats in a global system. While Saudi Arabia continues to rely on 
the U.S. for its defense, Iran, beginning with the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has taken a 
decidedly offensive approach but does not appear to be motivated by pragmatic foreign 
policy constraints. Unfortunately, this precludes the notion that Iran would be motivated 
by the typical application of sticks as is currently being administered by the Bush 
Administration or carrots as a result of diplomatic negotiations. 
                                                 
185 Mike Wallace, “Iranian Leader Opens Up, Ahmadinejad Speaks Candidly With Mike Wallace 
About Israel, Nukes, Bush,” CBS News, August 13, 2006. 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/09/60minutes/main1879867.shtml> (June 5, 2006). 
186 Mearsheimer and Walt would both support the idea that Iran’s geostrategic location would make it 
ideally suited for buck-passing with Russia, China or both. See Mearsheimer, 269-272 and Walt 153-161. 
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3. What Now?  
If it can be presumed that Tehran’s actions are consistent with offensive realism 
and balancing behavior than a well-fashioned response that would achieve strategic goals 
should be attainable. Because states acting offensively seek absolute power at the 
expense of all else, outside of military action there is little any state or international 
agency can do to prevent a state from achieving its objectives. Balancing too, assumes 
that states will respond to the perceived threats that surround them. If that is the case with 
Iran than the U.S. should reconsider its agreement to arm Iran’s Sunni neighbors because 
the measure can only be construed as an attempt to prepare these states for an escalation 
of tensions. Furthermore, the offer to provide the GCC states with peaceful nuclear 
energy programs in an attempt to dissuade them from developing their own uranium 
enrichment program will also be interpreted as a threat to Iran’s security and would 
certainly result in regional instability if not full scale conflict. This brings us to Waltz; he 
argues that stability can be achieved through the spread of nuclear weapons. Of course, 
this idea demands that the actors are rational which makes this notion an all too 
dangerous proposition. 
 The crux of the issue then is the behavior of Ahmadinejad as a reflection of the 
power brokers in Tehran and their credibility as rational actors. Vali Nasr, noted scholar 
on Iranian affairs, recently wrote in Foreign Affairs: 
Iran is not, despite common depictions, a messianic power determined to 
overturn the regional order in the name of Islamic militancy; it is an 
unexceptionally opportunistic state seeking to assert predominance in its 
immediate neighborhood. Thus, the task at hand for Washington is to 
create a situation in which Iran will find benefit in limiting its ambitions 
and in abiding by international norms.187  
However, as Amir Taheri wrote in a recent opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal, 
“The Islamic Republic does not know how to behave: as a nation-state, or as the 
embodiment of a revolution with universal messianic pretensions. Is it a country or a 
                                                 
187 Vali Nasr, “The Costs of Containing Iran,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (February 2008): 92.  
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cause?”188 Ahmadinejad continues to call for the destruction of Israel, while Iran defies 
the international community with its uranium enrichment program. President 
Ahmadinejad appears to represent an irrational unpredictability that cannot be swayed by 
the types of carrots and sticks currently imposed by the United Nations. As Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates recently pointed out, negotiations will not work unless the UN 
develops "leverage, either through economic or diplomatic or military pressures, on the 
Iranian government so that they believe they must have talks with the United States 
because there is something they want from us."189 Therefore, unless Iran determines its 
motivations and subsequently responds to the international community’s attempts to 
placate its objectives, it should be concluded that Iran is an irrational actor in which case 
normal rules of international politics do not apply.  
This is not to imply that the U.S. should immediately begin strategic strikes 
against Iran. Because the risk of failure is so great, it would seem that the administration 
has an obligation to exhaust all methods of enticement which should include diplomacy 
without preconditions. However, the notion that Tehran would be given a second or even 
a third chance to demonstrate behavior consistent of a modern nation-state is to believe 
that it is willing to alter its ideology. It also demonstrates a reluctance to take decisive 
action and connotes weakness of resolve. Unfortunately, until the other members of the 
Security Council are prepared to use the military in strategic strikes against Iran’s nuclear 
program, the U.S. can ill afford to accept full responsibility against another target in a 
region that has already demonized the ‘Great Satan’ for its century-long meddling in its 
affairs. Conversely, the U.S. cannot afford to wait until Iran has achieved nuclear status 
which explains why the Bush Administration continues to direct its ire toward Tehran 
while seemingly preparing the nation for another war. The U.S. is obligated to deny Iran 
the status enjoyed by modern nation-states and should therefore, refrain from open and 
direct negotiations with the rogue state. Iran must first demonstrate that it is prepared to 
accept the burdens of nuclear status and recognize that it has a requisite responsibility to 
                                                 
188 Amir Taheri, “The Problem with Talking to Iran” TheWallStreetJournal Online, May 28, 2008 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121193151568724469.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries> (May 
29, 2008). 
189 “Iran's Failed 'Litmus Test'.” 
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conform to international laws. Until that is clearly demonstrated by the power brokers in 
Iran, the Bush Administration is behaving within reason to believe that Tehran is not 
bound by the tenets of realism and balance of power theory and will not be swayed by 
traditional sticks or carrots. 
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